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INTRODUCTION: LAWYERS' ETHICS IN ADR
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley*
INTRODUCTION
Alternatives to the court adjudication of disputes generally have
been considered a welcome corrective to the American justice sys-
tem.' Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") is a term that in-
cludes a wide variety of processes for managing or resolving
disputes that differ in kind and scope from judicial adjudication.2
But ADR is more than simply an alternative or corrective to the
existing court structure. In many situations, ADR offers lawyers a
better way to practice law, presenting opportunities for problem
solving, peacemaking, and responsiveness to clients' needs and in-
terests that do not exist in traditional legal practice.
In this Symposium, a distinguished group of ADR scholars ex-
plores the emerging professional responsibility issues implicated by
ADR legal practice. These essays grew out of a joint program enti-
tled "ADR and the Professional Responsibility of Lawyers," spon-
sored by the Sections on Professional Responsibility and
Alternative Dispute Resolution of the Association of American
Law Schools. The essays focus on some of the critical ethical issues
related to lawyers' participation in ADR processes.
The ADR movement has undergone extraordinary growth since
Chief Justice Warren Burger posed the question, "Isn't there a bet-
ter way?" almost two decades ago.4 Nowhere has this growth been
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director of the Ford-
ham Law School Mediation Clinic. This Symposium has been developed from
presentations at the Association of American Law Schools' Annual Meeting, Joint
Session of the Sections on Professional Responsibility and Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution. The program was chaired by Professor Nolan-Haley on January 5, 2001, in San
Francisco, California.
1. Of course, there have been some critics. E.g., Owen M. Fiss, Comment,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 1359 (1985).
2. The term ADR also is understood to mean "appropriate dispute resolution."
E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyer-
ing, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 167-68 (1999).
3. See Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS,
49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1999) (describing the diverse functions performed by lawyers).
4. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (sug-
gesting that replacing litigation with arbitration would be a "better way" of resolving
disputes).
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more evident and relevant for lawyers than in the judicial system.
Today, court-connected ADR programs, offering processes such as
mediation, arbitration, and early neutral evaluation, have moved
beyond the experimentation stage and become institutionalized.
ADR processes are no longer offered to litigants simply as a better
way-in many situations, they are the only way to obtain access to
adjudication, as state and federal courts regularly require parties to
participate in some form of ADR before they may proceed to
trial.5
Lawyers' increased participation in ADR has generated a num-
ber of complex questions about their professional responsibilities.
Some of the emerging ethical issues relate to client counseling, con-
fidentiality, conflicts of interest, duties of good faith and candor,
unauthorized practice of law, and the impartiality of third-party
neutrals. In general, there are more questions than answers.
Lawyers have multiple roles in ADR legal practice. First, law-
yers engage with clients, courts, and judges, as well as with each
other. Lawyers counsel clients about the merits of ADR processes,
advocate for and accompany them in these processes, and review
and help implement the agreements that clients make in ADR. In
some cases, lawyers later may argue in court against the enforce-
ability of agreements created in ADR.6 In court-connected ADR
programs, lawyers may act as either third-party neutrals or as parti-
san advocates for clients. Finally, lawyers are often in a profes-
sional relationship with each other when participating in ADR
processes.7
Whether lawyers act as third-party neutrals in arbitration or me-
diation, advise clients about their ADR options, represent them in
ADR proceedings, or teach law students about these roles, they
are challenged by the question: "What system of ethics governs?"
The question becomes complex when lawyers acknowledge that
ADR is a multi-disciplinary field with many non-lawyer partici-
5. E.g., Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651, 658 (2000).
6. E.g., Patel v. Ashco Enter., Inc., 711 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(determining that mediation agreement was enforceable, despite plaintiff's argument
that parties had entered into the agreement while case was pending before a court
that lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
7. In this regard, some ADR scholars have argued for greater civility in specific
ADR processes. E.g., Constantine N. Katsoris, Advocacy With Civility: A Prescription
for Success, THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Jan. 2001, at 1 (addressing arbitration). I have
made a similar argument with respect to mediation. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Law-
yers, Clients and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369 (1998).
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN ADR
pants.8 Certainly, lawyers have the traditional ethics rules-the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. But it is questionable whether
these rules alone give sufficient guidance to understanding profes-
sional responsibilities in ADR legal practice. The ABA Ethics
2000 Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct has struggled to address some of the emerging issues re-
lated to lawyer participation in ADR. Its proposals will be
presented to the ABA for a first reading at the next annual meet-
ing in July 2001. 9 In the meantime, legal educators face the chal-
lenge of preparing students to engage in ethical ADR practice
without a clear compass.
The realities of practice challenge us to think critically about our
professional role as lawyers and law teachers and to consider what
it means to engage in "ethical" ADR lawyering. Is it, or should it
be, any different from traditional lawyering practice? Many ADR
scholars make the claim for difference and have suggested a variety
of ethics reforms, including a higher standard of truthfulness in ne-
gotiating; 10 a requirement of good faith in negotiating and mediat-
ing;" a duty to advise clients of ADR options;12 and even an
aspirational guide for lawyers, the "Ten Commandments of Appro-
priate Dispute Resolution.' 1 3 I also have argued for reform, urging
a greater appreciation of, and adherence to, the principle of in-
formed consent in mediation. 4 All these concerns push us to the
ultimate question raised in this Symposium: If ADR is an alterna-
tive way of lawyering, do we need an alternative set of ethical
rules?
The main theme running through the following essays is that
change is needed, that current ethics rules and codes must be ad-
justed, and new rules must be drafted that respond to the subtleties
8. See AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS (1994), available at http://www.adr.org/-Ies/ethics/standard.html.
9. ABA ETmICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, CHAIR'S INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Nov. 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-intro-and-summary-changes.html.
10. James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A Pro-
posal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255 (1999).
11. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended,
or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575 (1997).
12. Robert F. Cochran Jr., ADR, the ABA, and Client Control: A Proposal that the
Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV.
183 (1999).
13. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 167-68.
14. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Princi-
ple for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775 (1999).
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and complexities of the issues raised in ADR legal practice. In
short, "new wine requires new wineskins.' ' 5
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow provides an overview of the
major ethical issues facing lawyers in ADR practice and reviews
the current ethics rules landscape in ADR. 16 Professor Robert
Cochran offers a proposal to amend the current professional re-
sponsibility rules to include a mandate for advising clients of ADR
options. 7 Professor Kimberlee Kovach argues in favor of a new
ethic for non-adversarial representation.1 8 And Professor Stephen
Huber addresses a number of critical ethical issues implicated by
arbitration practice.19 We hope that the ideas and proposals ad-
vanced here can provide a framework for future deliberations
about the professional responsibilities of lawyers in ADR.
15. Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Law-
yer Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-adversarial Approach to Problem-
Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935 (2001).
16. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of Professional Re-
sponsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979 (2001).
17. Robert F. Cochran Jr., Professional Rules and ADR: Control of Alternative
Dispute Resolution Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal and Other Pro-
fessional Responsibility Standards, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895 (2001).
18. Kovach, supra note 15.
19. Stephen K. Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflicts of Interest, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 915 (2001).
PROFESSIONAL RULES AND ADR:
CONTROL OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION UNDER THE ABA ETHICS 2000
COMMISSION PROPOSAL AND OTHER
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
STANDARDS
Robert F Cochran Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1900s, Boston, Massachusetts witnessed a nasty law-
suit between two brothers.1 The papers filed in the case accused
the older brother-trustee of the family estate-of a breach of
trust. In many respects, the suit was typical: the accusations were
harsh, the defendant took them personally, and the litigation in-
creased the animosity between the parties. There were, however, a
few unusual aspects of the suit. One was the prominence of the
participants. The trustee-brother was Samuel Warren, former law
partner of Louis D. Brandeis and co-author with Brandeis of the
Harvard Law Review privacy article, possibly the most famous and
influential law review article ever published.2 The plaintiff-brother
was Ned Warren, early gay activist and one of the founders of the
* Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law;
J.D., University of Virginia. This is an expanded version of a speech given at the
Annual Meeting, Joint Session of the Sections on Professional Responsibility and Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution, in San Francisco, California, on January 5, 2001. Por-
tions of this speech were adapted from Robert F. Cochran Jr., ADR, the ABA, and
Client Control.: A Proposal that the Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR
Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 183 (1999). My thanks to Beth Nunnick for her
research assistance.
1. For the facts of the Warren case described in the following paragraphs, see
John T. Noonan Jr., Distinguished Alumni Lecture-Other People's Morals: The Law-
yer's Conscience, 48 TENN. L. REV. 227, 234-36 (1981) (citing Warren v. Warren, No.
14630, Mass., filed Dec. 13, 1909); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR.,
LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994). The case involved a will
drafted by Louis D. Brandeis while he was practicing law. John P. Frank, The Legal
Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 694-98 (1965) (discussing the
charge, facts, and ethical problems in the case).
2. Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
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Boston Museum of Art.3 A second unusual aspect of the case was
its tragic consequence. After being subjected to two days of harsh
cross-examination, Sam Warren died; apparently, he committed su-
icide. A third unusual aspect of the case is the note Ned wrote to
Sam and delivered on the day that the suit was filed. This note
reveals something not only about the relationship between Ned
and Sam, but also about the relationship between Ned and his law-
yers. It reads, in part:
The phrases [in the complaint] are such as in a legal document I
have felt obliged to sign, but are very far from representing my
feelings toward you .... Let us try to agree; it would be much
pleasanter.
Your affectionate brother, E.P. Warren.4
It is not surprising that the allegations of a breach of trust in the
complaint had more influence on Sam than the brotherly note.
The suit proceeded toward its tragic consequence.
The note suggests that Ned's lawyers had two characteristics that
are common among lawyers: they were aggressive and paternalis-
tic. These lawyers filed suit and made vicious allegations against
Sam, in spite of the better instincts of their client. Ned likely
agreed to the filing of the suit, but as he wrote in his note, 'the
allegations "are very far from representing my feelings toward
you."
'5
Today, some lawyers would recognize this case as a good candi-
date for mediation-parties who have had, and are likely to con-
tinue to have, a long-term family and business relationship; parties
who are likely to want to preserve family privacy; parties who are
likely to have other family members who will want to preserve
family peace and privacy; and, if Ned's letter is to be believed, a
plaintiff who as an "affectionate brother" believes it would be
"much pleasanter" to "agree."6 Today, the right lawyers might
have presented Ned with the option of pursuing mediation and this
case might have been resolved peacefully. I wish I could say that
Ned's lawyers' methods were the methods of an earlier era, but,
unfortunately, their type of practice is very much alive and well
today. One of the most often heard complaints about lawyers is
3. See generally DAVID Sox, BACHELORS OF ART: EDWARD PERRY WARREN
AND THE LEWES HOUSE BROTHERHOOD (1991).
4. Noonan, supra note 1, at 234-36.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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that they exacerbate conflict between people. Many lawyers today
would follow in the footsteps of Ned's lawyers.
I have suggested elsewhere that lawyers should present the op-
tion of pursuing alternative means of dispute resolution ("ADR")
to clients as a matter of good practice,7 and that lawyers might be
subject to malpractice liability if they fail to do so. 8 My argument
here is that the rules of the legal profession should require lawyers
to present such options to clients. Section I will consider the argu-
ments for giving control of this decision to clients. Section II will
offer analysis of current professional rules that address this issue.
Section III will focus on the recent proposals of the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") Ethics 2000 Commission on the Evaluation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Ethics 2000 Commis-
sion" or "Commission"). Finally, in Section IV, I will propose two
alternate rules that would give clients greater control over ADR
choices: the client control model and the informed consent model.
7. ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAw: A COLLABORA-
TIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 189-202 (1999).
8. Robert F. Cochran Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client
Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotia-
tion and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990). I
argue that a right of client control of ADR should be adopted based on the medical
informed consent analogy. Courts developed the right of medical patients to choose
alternatives to surgery as a medical malpractice rule. Though there are strong paral-
lels between the right of patients to choose alternatives to surgery and the proposed
right of clients to choose ADR options, it is unlikely that an ADR rule will develop as
a matter of malpractice law. It is likely that courts and juries would recognize the right
of a client to choose ADR options (in light of the arguments made below), but it is
unlikely that a client, in a particular case, would be able to establish that the lawyer's
failure was a cause-in-fact of the client's loss. In the medical informed consent action,
the patient must establish that had the doctor informed her of an alternative, she
would have chosen the alternative, and that the alternative likely would have yielded
a better result. This presents difficulties in some informed consent cases, but patients
often are able to meet this burden. In a comparable action for the failure of the law-
yer to present ADR options to a client, the client would have to show not only that
(1) he would have chosen the alternative means of dispute resolution, but (2) that the
other side would have agreed to it, and (3) that it would have yielded a more
favorable result. For further discussion of the possibility of establishing cause-in-fact
in a claim against an attorney for failure to present the ADR option, see id. at 871-76.
The difficulties that the client would have in meeting such a burden make it unlikely
that the right to choose ADR options will develop as a matter of legal malpractice.
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I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CLIENT CONTROL OF ADR
A. Preserving Client Dignity, Especially of Poorer or
Inexperienced Clients
Maintaining a significant level of control over one's life is an im-
portant aspect of human dignity. One of the primary roles of the
lawyer is to increase the client's control of her own life when that
control is threatened by individuals, the state, or other institutions.
Nevertheless, one of the dangers of lawyering is that the lawyer
merely will become another person who tells the client what to do.
In this way, lawyers can be threats to, instead of protectors of, cli-
ent dignity.
The market does a pretty good job of protecting the dignity of
the wealthy, educated client who has experience dealing with law-
yers. If a lawyer is too controlling, the wealthy, educated client has
the means and knowledge to seek representation elsewhere. Such
clients do not need the professional responsibility rules to protect
their right to autonomy within the lawyer-client relationship. They
are likely to know about alternative means of dispute resolution,
and, if they are interested, can demand that lawyers pursue them.
One of the biggest areas of growth of ADR in recent years has
been among corporations that have demanded that their lawyers
seek alternatives to litigation. 9 It is the poorer, less-informed cli-
ents who need the rules of professional conduct to protect their
rights to self-determination. As the following subsection explains,
the determination of whether to pursue ADR is likely to have a
significant impact on the client's life.
B. The Importance to the Client of the Means of
Dispute Resolution
The choice of the means of dispute resolution is likely to have a
significant impact on the client's time and money, the client's rela-
tionship with the opposing party, the ultimate result of the repre-
sentation, and the client's privacy and personal satisfaction.
Mediation and arbitration can save the client both time and
money. 10 Parties generally can arrange to have a dispute mediated
9. See, e.g., Ronald D. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 536
(1994) (discussing how corporations became increasingly interested in ADR in the
1980s, during a period of falling interest rates and rising legal costs, because lengthy
litigation no longer served their financial interests).
10. E.g., Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7
JUST. SYs. J. 420, 435-37 (1982); KARL D. SCHULTZ, FLA. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR.,
898
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or arbitrated at a much earlier date than they can have it liti-
gated. 1 In addition, once mediation and arbitration begin, they
may require a shorter amount of attorney and client time than liti-
gation or attorney negotiation.' 2 A savings in attorney time gener-
ally means a savings in attorney fees. In cases in which mediation
is successful and attorney negotiation would not have been success-
ful, the savings in time and money can be substantial.'3 Of course,
if mediation or non-binding arbitration fail to resolve a dispute,
ADR is likely to increase the costs to the client-the client must
pay for the costs of litigation as well as the costs of ADR. Whether
a particular case is likely to be resolved through ADR generally
will turn on its facts. Thus, the lawyer should explain this risk, as
well as the potential benefits, of ADR to the client.
Another potential benefit of ADR is that the parties are likely to
have a better relationship after ADR than after a trial. 4 This may
be especially important in cases in which the parties may have a
future relationship, such as in family and commercial cases. 5 The
FLORIDA'S ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: AN EM-
PIRICAL ASSESSMENT Viii (1990), cited by Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for
Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 702, 703 (1994).
11. Though the parties can arrange for mediation at an early date, if the parties
fail to resolve a dispute through mediation, and then have to get a trial date, the
mediation may delay the resolution of the dispute. The parties can avoid this problem
if they set a trial date and mediate the dispute pending the trial. Parties can be certain
that a dispute will be resolved at an early date if a case is arbitrated. LEONARD L.
RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 146-47
(1988). As with mediation, the parties can arrange to have a case arbitrated within a
short period of time, and, unlike mediation, the parties can be sure that arbitration
will result in a resolution of the dispute. The client does not have the right to reject
the decision of the arbitrator, but the client can be confident that the arbitrator will
reach a decision.
12. One study found that companies using mediation in business disputes most
often achieved settlement an average of ten months earlier than those companies who
used mediation least often. Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the
Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations,
13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 831, 843 (1998).
13. Studies have indicated that mediation is more successful at resolving disputes
than attorney negotiation. E.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Media-
tion: Strengths and Weaknesses Over Time, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION 51, 57-58 (Howard Davidson et al. eds., 1982).
14. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 11, at 24. A study comparing child custody
agreements reached through mediation with other child custody arrangements found
that a substantially higher number of the parties who had mediated agreements were
in compliance with the terms of those agreements. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note
13, at 59.
15. Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 (1986).
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Warren case was both a family and a commercial dispute. Ned and
Sam might have preferred a peaceful resolution of the dispute,
both for the sake of family peace and for the sake of the smooth
and efficient operation of the family business. Whereas litigation
and attorney negotiation are likely to inhibit communication be-
tween the parties, mediators try to open lines of communication so
that the parties can better understand one another. 6 The ultimate
goal of many mediators is the reconciliation of the parties. 17 In-
deed, parties are more likely to comply with and less likely to liti-
gate over agreements that they reach through mediation.18
In many cases, mediation is likely to yield a better result for both
parties than litigation or attorney negotiation. In mediation, the
parties may develop a creative resolution of a dispute that benefits
both parties and is different from any remedy a court could pro-
vide.1 9 Attorneys, of course, may reach a creative resolution of a
dispute in negotiation, but the parties are often more familiar with
the subject matter of the dispute than are their attorneys and, thus,
may be more likely to develop a creative resolution.2 °
An additional advantage that accrues to the parties of alternative
methods of dispute resolution is privacy. Mediation sessions and
arbitration hearings generally are not open to the public.2' Privacy
can be especially important to parties to a family dispute, as in the
Warren case.22
A final important justification for requiring lawyers to present
ADR options to clients is that clients generally are more satisfied
with ADR than with litigation and attorney negotiation. 23 Al-
16. Id.
17. See generally Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation,
94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985).
18. JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 248 (1989).
19. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 15, at 429.
20. In mediation, the parties are involved directly in the negotiation process and
can minimize the effect the lawyer's self-interest might have on the results. Id. at 430.
21. Supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
22. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 11, at 148.
23. E.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in
Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 254-60 (1981) (discussing high
satisfaction levels for mediation users and attributing those positive responses to par-
ties' perceptions of "processual advantages"); Pearson, supra note 10, at 432 (report-
ing on a long-term follow-up study showing that sixty-nine percent of clients who
reached agreements in the Denver Custody Mediation Project were satisfied, as com-
pared with only fifty-three percent of adversarial control group members); Gary Phe-
lan, Dispute Resolution the Mediation Way, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 18, 1997 (stating that
a survey of general counsel, deputy counsel, and chief litigators from 528 of the larg-
est 1000 corporations in the United States indicated that eighty-one percent felt medi-
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though the value of this satisfaction may be difficult to measure, it
seems that ADR increases client feelings of self-worth as clients
take more control of their lives. ADR empowers clients.
I am not suggesting that in every case all these factors will point
toward pursuing ADR; rather, I suggest that enough of these fac-
tors are likely to point toward pursuing ADR that the lawyer
should inform the client of the ADR options and allow the client to
decide whether to pursue them. There are risks and potential ben-
efits to both litigation and ADR and the choice between them
should be made by the client. The client is likely to bear most of
the risks of the choice, and the client is likely to be the best judge
of her own interests.
C. The Lawyer's Conflict of Interest
The decision whether to pursue ADR should be made by clients,
rather than attorneys, not only because of the risks and potential
benefits to clients, but because lawyers are likely to have a conflict
of interest as to this issue. If ADR requires less attorney time than
traditional means of dispute resolution, lawyers who are paid on an
hourly basis will lose money. If the parties choose to mediate with-
out the presence of attorneys, the loss is likely to be especially
great.
Attorneys who do not have experience with mediation and arbi-
tration will have an additional conflict of interest as to whether to
pursue these processes.24 If a client chooses to pursue mediation or
arbitration and the lawyer does not have experience with them, the
lawyer may have to refer the case to another attorney. One study
found that the strongest predictor for whether a lawyer will refer
clients to mediation is whether the lawyer has experience in media-
tion. 5 The availability of ADR to a client should not turn on
whether the lawyer has had experience with it.
ation provides a "more satisfactory process" than litigation and sixty-six percent felt
mediation provides "more satisfactory settlements"); Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects
of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims and
Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 565, 568 & nn.15-16 (1997) (report-
ing on studies finding that mediation users are generally more satisfied and view the
process as more fair than do users of adjudication).
24. Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29, 49-50 (1982).
25. Richard J. Klimoski et al., Non-Binding Dispute Resolution for Business Dis-
putes? Corporate Counsel Are of Two Minds (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors), cited by Rogers & McEwen, supra note 12, at 845.
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II. CONTROL OF ADR UNDER EXISTING PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS
Professional groups have proposed, and jurisdictions have
adopted, a wide variety of standards that are likely to have an im-
pact on who makes the decision whether to pursue ADR. Jurisdic-
tions have at least four potential means of involving clients in the
question of whether to pursue ADR: client consultation, client no-
tice, client control, and informed consent models. In this section, I
consider those models that are currently in effect.
A. Consultation Models: Current ABA Model Rule 1.2 and
Virginia's Rule 1.2
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules,"
"MRs," or "Rules") govern lawyers in the vast majority of states.2 6
The Model Rules were adopted in 1983, before use of ADR was
common, yet the Rules give some guidance that can be helpful in
determining who should control ADR decisions. Model Rule
1.2(a) allocates lawyer and client decision-making responsibility.
In part, it states that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." 7
The decision whether to pursue ADR seems to be a means deci-
sion, and because alternative means of dispute resolution may be
used to seek the client's objectives, it is likely that the Model Rules
require lawyers to consult with clients about them.
The comments to Virginia's newly adopted version of the Model
Rules make this reasoning explicit. Effective in 2000, Virginia ad-
ded the italicized portion of the following to the ABA's Official
Comment to MR 1.2:
Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in
the objectives and means of representation. The client has ulti-
mate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation, within the limits imposed by the law and the
lawyer's professional obligations. Within those limits, a client
also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the means to be
used in pursuing those objectives. In that context, a lawyer shall
advise the client about the advantages, disadvantages, and availa-
26. AM. BAR Ass'N & BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:3 (1984).
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1999).
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bility of dispute resolution processes that might be appropriate in
pursuing these objectives.28
Other portions of the ABA's Official Comment to MR 1.2 state
that clients should control some means decisions:
In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility
for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the
client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred
and concern for third persons who might be adversely
affected.29
It may be that under this Comment, the lawyer "should defer to
the client" as to whether to pursue ADR. The decision whether to
pursue ADR is not so technical that a client cannot understand it.
Furthermore, whether the client engages in ADR is likely to have
such a significant impact on the two factors mentioned by the Com-
ment-expenses incurred and concern for third parties-that leav-
ing this decision to the client is justified. As noted in the previous
section, some methods of ADR are likely to save money and pre-
serve the client's relationship with the opposing party.30 The im-
portance that the Comment gives to these considerations, coupled
with the non-technical nature of the decision whether to pursue
ADR, suggest that under the Comment the lawyer should consult
with the client about whether to pursue ADR. But the Comment
is couched in hortatory language ("should"), rather than
mandatory language ("must"). A violation of hortatory language
in the lawyer codes does not subject a lawyer to discipline.31
Some commentators have suggested that MR 1.4(b) imposes a
duty on lawyers to present ADR options to clients.32 It states: "A
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the repre-
sentation. '33 Much as I would like this section to require lawyers
to present ADR options to clients, it does not identify the "in-
formed decisions" that clients are entitled to make. Model Rule
1.4(b) merely dictates the level of counseling assistance a lawyer
must give clients about issues that the client is entitled to resolve
under MR 1.2(a). Since MR 1.2 only requires the lawyer to "con-
28. VA. CODE ANN. R. Pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt.[l] (Michie 2000) (emphasis added).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2. cmt.[1].
30. Supra Section I.B.
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Scope [13].
32. See generally Edward A. Dauer & Cynthia McNeil, New Rules on ADR: Pro-
fessional Ethics, Shotguns and Fish, 21 CoLo. LAW. 1877 (1992).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.4 (emphasis added).
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suit" with the client concerning means decisions, it does not appear
that the Model Rules require the lawyer to allow the client to
choose whether to pursue ADR.
The term "consult" suggests that the client is entitled to some-
thing less than control of ADR, but something more than mere
notice of the means that the lawyer has chosen.34 When I am hired
as a consultant, I do not have control over decisions, but I am lis-
tened to carefully and am likely to have substantial influence on
decisions that are made. As to the ADR decision, the Model
Rules' duty to consult probably requires that the lawyer, in the
terms used by the Virginia Rule's Comment, "advise the client
about the advantages, disadvantages, and availability of dispute
resolution processes that might be appropriate in pursuing these
objectives ' 35 and obtain and consider the client's opinion about the
matter. Ultimate control of means appears to be in the hands of
the lawyer under the Model Rules, but only after a serious evalua-
tion of those means with the client. Of course, in the case of
wealthy, informed clients, the practical effect of consultation is
likely to be client control. If the lawyer does not comply with cli-
ent wishes, the client is likely to go elsewhere. Consultation, how-
ever, is unlikely to give much power to the poor or weak client.36
B. Client Notification Models: The Colorado Rule
Several jurisdictions encourage, but do not require, lawyers to
inform clients of ADR options. 37 For example, Rule 2.1 of the Col-
orado Rules of Professional Conduct states:
34. The Terminology section of the Model Rules states: "'Consult' or 'Consulta-
tion' denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client
to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, Terminology [2]. The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission moved the Terminol-
ogy section to a new rule, Proposed Rule 1.0, and deleted the definition of "Consult"
or "Consultation." ABA ETHIcs 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT, FINAL RULES PART Two, Proposed Rule 1.0 (Dec. 1, 2000),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-final rules2.html.
35. VA. CODE ANN. R. Pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt.[1] (Michie 2000).
36. Supra Section I.A.
37. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. CT. R. chs. 18-20 app. R. 2.1 (2000); HAW. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2000) ("[A] lawyer should advise a client of alternative
forms of dispute resolution which might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve
the legal dispute or to reach the legal objective sought."); GA. R. & REoS. FOR THE
ORG. AND GOV'T OF THE STATE BAR R. 3-107, EC 7-5 (1999) ("A lawyer as advisor
has a duty to advise the client as to various forms of dispute resolution. When a mat-
ter is likely to involve litigation, a lawyer has a duty to inform the client of forms of
dispute resolution which might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.");
OHIO STATE BAR Ass'N RPTR. xli (1997) (exhorting lawyers to advise clients of ADR
options); THE TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM § II
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In a matter involving or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer
should advise the client of alternative forms of dispute resolu-
tion which might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve
the legal dispute or to reach the legal objective sought.38
Although the Colorado Rule obviously was designed to en-
courage lawyers to discuss ADR options with clients, it has several
weaknesses. First, the Colorado Rule is hortatory ("a lawyer
should .... "). It does not require lawyers to present ADR options
to clients. Second, the Rule encourages lawyers only to "advise the
client" of ADR. Presumably, a lawyer could meet the require-
ments of the Rule merely by describing ADR methods and then
informing the client that he has decided to file suit. Unlike a con-
sultation model, the lawyer need not seek client input. Finally, the
Colorado Rule may actually weaken the possibility that MR 1.2
(which remains a part of the Colorado professional rules) would be
interpreted by a court or disciplinary body to require that lawyers
"consult" with clients about ADR, as suggested in the previous
section.
C. Client Control: The Michigan Rule
A few jurisdictions have adopted rules that require lawyers to
allow clients to control the decision whether to pursue ADR. A
Michigan Bar opinion states:
A lawyer has an obligation to recommend alternatives to litiga-
tion when an alternative is a reasonable course of action to fur-
ther the client's interest, or if the lawyer has any reason to think
that the client would find the alternative desirable.
While not all options which are theoretically available need
be discussed, any doubts about whether a possible option is rea-
A(11) (1989) ("I will advise my client regarding the availability of mediation, arbitra-
tion, and other alternative methods of resolving and settling disputes."); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-7-101 (Michie 1999) (encouraging lawyers to advise clients of ADR op-
tions); N.J. Sup. CT. R. 1:40-1 (West 2000) (encouraging attorneys to become familiar
with dispute resolution programs and inform clients of their availability).
A few court rules, statutes, and ethics opinions require lawyers to initiate discus-
sions of ADR options with clients. E.g., MAss. LOCAL R. (D. MAss.) R. 16.1(D)(3)(b)
(1995) (requiring attorneys to certify that ADR options have been discussed with the
client); MicH. BAR Ass'N, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, FORMAL OP. RI-255
(1996) (requiring attorney to inform client if opposing counsel suggests ADR); PA.
BAR ASS'N, COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OP. 90-
125 (1991) (stating that Rule 1.4 and Rule 1.2 read together obligate a lawyer to in-
form a client when the opposing counsel suggests mediation).
38. COLO. REV. STAT. CT. R. chs. 18-20 app. R. 2.1 (2000),
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sonably likely to promote the clients [sic] interests, as well as
any doubt about whether the client would desire the use of any
particular option, should be resolved in favor of providing the
information to the client and allowing the client to render a
decision.39
In addition, the rule articulated in the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers may require lawyers to allow clients to
control ADR decisions. I will discuss the Restatement as well as a
proposed professional rule that would give clients control of the
ADR decision in a later Section.40
Il. THE ABA ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION
In 1997, the American Bar Association appointed the Ethics
2000 Commission and gave it the express responsibility of updating
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.4" The Model Rules had
been adopted in 1983, when ADR was in its infancy.42 Tremendous
growth in the ADR field had occurred since the Model Rules were
adopted, and it was my hope that the Ethics 2000 Commission
would recognize the importance of ADR and the importance of
client control over the decision whether to pursue it.43 Unfortu-
nately, the Commission's proposed rules may undercut the possi-
bility of client influence over the ADR decision.
The Commission's initial "Proposed Rule," issued as a "Public
Discussion Draft" on April 24, 2000, would have removed the lan-
guage from MR 1.2 that requires lawyers to consult with clients
about means decisions-a step that would have had implications
far beyond the issue of control of ADR.44 Not surprisingly, this
proposal was short-lived. As I suggested in testimony before the
39. Formal Op. RI-262; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 36.185 (Supp. 1998) (requiring
all parties in civil actions to file a confidential statement indicating their knowledge of
ADR and their election whether to participate in an ADR proceeding).
40. See infra Section IV.B.
41. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, CHAIR'S INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Dec. 1, 2000), http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-intro-and-summary-changes.html.
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1999).
43. Robert F. Cochran Jr., ADR, the ABA, and Client Control: A Proposal that the
Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV.
183 (1999).
44. The Commission's proposal was to delete the following language with the
strikethrough and add the italicized language to Model Rule 1.2(a): "[A] lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and shfA
.. s.i. .with may take such action on behalf of the client as to the mzans by w.,hih th y
ar e. bei puf.s is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation." ABA ETH-
ICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT. PRO-
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Commission, this proposal would have moved us in the wrong di-
rection, toward lawyer paternalism and away from client
autonomy.45
The Commission's "Final Proposed Rules," issued on December
1, 2000, provide for what may be a weakened client right to be
consulted about means decisions. In a Comment, the Commission
raises the possibility that a client might have a right to be informed
about ADR. Three provisions of the Commission's proposed rules
are relevant to ADR decision-making.
POSED RULE 1.2-PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT (Apr. 24, 2000), http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/rulel2.html.
45. As I testified:
[The Ethics 2000 Commission's] Proposed Rule 1.2 contains one of the most
surprising proposed changes to the rules. Under Proposed Rule 1.2, clients
continue to control the objectives of the representation, but they no longer
have the right to be consulted about the means used to obtain those objec-
tives. This moves in exactly the opposite direction from the general direction
of the law toward client autonomy. The Commission appears to move us ...
from consultation to pure lawyer control.
Comment 2 of the Reporter's Explanation of Changes states that the
"Commission believes that the current formulation [of MR 1.2] is flawed
because it ... suggests too strongly that the lawyer never has to abide by a
client decision with respect to means as distinct from objectives." The prob-
lem is that the Commission's proposed formulation continues to strongly
suggest that "the lawyer never has to abide by a client decision with respect
to means," and it withdraws the requirement that the lawyer consult with the
client about means decisions. In my view, the Rule should expressly expand
client control, not retract it. The Proposed Rule withdraws one of the few
requirements that lawyers give clients any influence as to means decisions.
Comment 2 of the Reporter's Explanation of Changes to Rule 1.2 also
states that "the Commission recommends that the lawyer's responsibilities to
consult with the client about the means to be used . . . be determined by
reference to the lawyer's duty under Rule 1.4 to keep the client reasonably
informed about the representation." It seems to me that a "duty to inform"
under the Proposed Rule 1.4 is a much weaker duty than a duty to "consult"
under the current Model Rule 1.2(a). For example, a duty to keep the client
informed would be met by notice that the lawyer has filed suit against the
opposing party. A duty to consult with the client would at least require that
the lawyer contact the client before filing suit and get the client's reaction to
the proposed suit. Of course, my earlier argument is that the client needs
some muscle. My proposals would require the lawyer to not merely inform
or consult with the client, but to allow the client to decide whether to sue
and whether to pursue an alternative means of dispute resolution.
ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES 1.2, 1.4, AND 2.1 AND A PROPOSAL THAT
MODEL RULE 1.2 REQUIRE LAWYERS TO ALLOW CLIENTS TO CHOOSE WHETHER TO
PURSUE ADR [hereinafter ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N, COMMENTS] (July 6, 2000)
(statement of Robert F. Cochran Jr.), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cochran
10.html.
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First, the Commission's Final Proposed Rule 1.2 adds the itali-
cized language to the original Model Rule:
Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority
Between Client and Lawyer A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation [and], as
required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means
by which they are to be pursued....
Note that the Commission has re-instituted the client's right to be
consulted about means decisions, but it is now "required by Rule
1.4," rather than Rule 1.2.
The relevant portion of the Commission's Proposed Rule 1.4
reads as follows:
Rule 1.4: Communication A lawyer shall.., reasonably con-
sult with the client about the means by which the client's objec-
tives are to be accomplished ....
Moving the client's right to be consulted about means decisions
from MR 1.2 to Proposed Rule 1.4 initially might appear to be
merely a matter of moving boxes around, but on closer examina-
tion, the move may be significant. Under the proposed rules, the
client's right to be consulted about means decisions appears under
Rule 1.4, labeled "communication," rather than under Rule 1.2,
which allocates authority between client and lawyer. Under the
proposed rule, the right to be consulted looks much more like the
right to be informed than the right to have influence.
In addition to the changes to Rules 1.2 and 1.4, a change to the
Comments to Rule 2.1 in the Ethics 2000 Commission proposal in-
cludes a specific reference to the decision whether to pursue ADR.
Model Rule 2.1 is entitled "Advisor" and requires the lawyer to
"render candid advice."48 The Commission would add the itali-
cized portion below to the Comment:
In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by
the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client pro-
poses a course of action that is likely to result in substantial ad-
verse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the
client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer at offer ad-
46. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, supra note 34, R. 1.2(a).
47. Id. R. 1.4(a). The proposed rule adds the word "reasonably" to the language
that originally appeared in Model Rule 1.2. I do not see this as a significant limitation
on the client's right to be consulted. I am confident that any court or bar committee
would have implied this limitation to the original language of Model Rule 1.2.
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1999).
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vice if the client's course of action is related to the representa-
tion. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may
be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dis-
pute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to
litigation.4 9
I have three concerns with the Commission's proposed addition
to this Comment. My first concern is with the weakness of the
Comment's language. The Commission's proposal says merely that
MR 1.4 may require the lawyer to inform the client of ADR. That
language fails to give the lawyer any guidance. The ambiguity (and
ambivalence) of the Comment certainly will give any attorney
charged with a disciplinary violation a strong argument that he
should not be disciplined. Nevertheless, the rule does raise the
possibility that MR 1.4 will require lawyers to notify clients of
ADR, and it may be that careful lawyers will give such notice in
order to avoid the possibility of discipline.
Second, the Comment states only that lawyers may be required
to inform clients about ADR. Both MR 1.2 and the Commission's
Proposed Rule 1.4 require the lawyer to "consult" with the client
about means decisions. As I argued previously, I think that the
right to be consulted is more than the right merely to be notified.5"
A duty to consult would at least require the lawyer to hear and
consider the opinion of the client on the ADR issue.
My final concern is with locating the provision in the Comment
to Rule 2.1 (though, given the weakness of the rule, it may be just
as well). Lawyers who are wrestling with the question whether to
discuss ADR options with clients are more likely to go to MR 1.2
or 1.4, which have to do with allocation of authority and communi-
cation, than to MR 2.1. The Commission's proposed addition to
the comment is, by its very terms, a statement about what "may be
necessary under Rule 1.4." It would seem that the proper location
of the Commission's Comment would be under Rule 1.4 (though,
as I argue below, I believe that a much stronger rule should be
added as part of Rule 1.2.).
IV. Two ALTERNATE PROPOSALS: INFORMED CONSENT
OR CLIENT CHOICE
It is important that clients get not only information, but empow-
erment. Information about ADR is likely to enable the client who
49. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, supra note 34, R. 2.1 cmt.[5].
50. Supra Section II.A.
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is already powerful to choose ADR, but it may not help the poor
or uneducated client. I propose two alternate rules, either one of
which would allow clients to make the ultimate decision whether
to pursue litigation or ADR. Both rules have strong precedents.
Whatever rule is adopted, it should be included in Rule 1.2(a), the
rule that allocates authority between lawyer and client. Model
Rule 1.2(a) currently reads:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settle-
ment of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by
the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify.5
A. Alternative One: Informed Consent
My first proposal is that the ABA add the following sentence at
the end of MR 1.2(a): "A lawyer may litigate a matter if the client
gives informed consent."
Several provisions of the Model Rules and the Proposed Rules
give the client the right to informed consent as to other matters.
Under Proposed Rule 1.2, the lawyer must obtain the client's in-
formed consent to limit the scope of the representation; under MR
1.6, the lawyer must obtain informed consent to the disclosure of
confidential information; and under MRs 1.7 to 1.12 the lawyer
must obtain informed consent to several types of conflicts of inter-
est. Surprisingly, nowhere in the Model Rules or the Proposed
Rules is the lawyer required to get the client's informed consent to
litigating a case. Litigation is at least as important as are these
other matters that require the client's informed consent.
The Commission's Proposed Rule 1.0: Terminology includes the
following provision:
(e) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement to a proposed
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and rea-
sonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct.52
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1999).
52. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, supra note 34, R. 1.0(e).
PROFESSIONAL RULES AND ADR
If the Rules were to require that the lawyer obtain the client's in-
formed consent before litigating a matter, pursuant to this defini-
tion, the lawyer would have to obtain the client's "agreement to
[litigate] after the lawyer has communicated [to the client] ade-
quate information and explanation about the material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives to the [litigation]." Those alter-
natives would include means of ADR that are reasonably available
in the jurisdiction.
There is an analogy between the rule that I am proposing here
and the informed consent right of medical patients. Medical pa-
tients have the right to be informed about and choose alternatives
to a proposed medical procedure. 3 The recognition of the medical
informed consent cause of action was a choice for patient auton-
omy and against doctor paternalism. Because the patient is the
person who bears the greatest risks, the courts concluded that the
patient should control the choice.
Legal clients have similar interests in being able to choose alter-
natives to litigation. In many respects, litigation is to the client
what surgery is to the patient. Both litigation and surgery are
likely to carry great risks and offer great potential benefits for the
client or patient. It is not that ADR is always better than litigation,
any more than conservative medical care is always better than sur-
gery. It is a question of who should decide. An attorney discipli-
nary rule requiring the lawyer to present the client with the option
of pursuing ADR would be based on a concern for client dignity, as
the duty of doctors to obtain informed consent is based on a con-
cern for patient dignity; to the extent reasonably possible, individu-
als should control decisions that affect them.
B. Alternative Two: Client Choice
As an alternative, the ABA might add the italicized portion of
the following to Proposed Rule 1.2 (a):
53. Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 838 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (explaining that a lack
of informed consent does not amount to liability unless it is the proximate cause of
the patient's injuries); Dunham v. Wright, 302 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (M.D. Pa. 1969)
(holding that informed consent may not be required in emergency cases); Williams v.
Menehan, 379 P.2d 292, 294 (Kan. 1963) (stating that a doctor need only make a
"reasonable disclosure" to obtain informed consent); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d
1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (determining that patient did not give informed consent to
radiation treatment because physician failed to warn her of the hazards involved);
Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 18-19 (Mo. 1960) (holding that doctors owe their
patients who are in possession of their mental faculties the duty to inform them of the
possible serious collateral dangers of shock therapy).
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A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to pursue a
means of alternative dispute resolution and whether to settle a
matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether to testify.54
The existing Rule identifies several means decisions that are re-
served for the client. In my view, the decision whether to pursue
alternative means of dispute resolution is of equal importance to
these decisions. My proposal would give the client the right to
choose to pursue ADR and would preclude the lawyer from adopt-
ing a form of ADR against the client's wishes.
As noted previously, a few jurisdictions, through bar opinions
and court rules, have given clients the right to control the ADR
decision. 6 In addition, under the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, it may be that a lawyer is required to allow
clients to make this decision. Section 33(1) states:
As between client and lawyer.., the following and comparable
decisions are reserved to the client except when the client has
validly authorized the lawyer to make the particular decision:
whether and on what terms to settle a claim; how a criminal de-
fendant should plead; whether a criminal defendant should
waive jury trial; whether a criminal defendant should testify; and
whether to appeal in a civil proceeding or criminal
prosecution.57
The Restatement's Comment to 33(1) identifies the factors that de-
termine whether a means decision is "comparable" to those deci-
sions explicitly allocated to the client's control and therefore also
within the client's control. Those factors are:
[H]ow important the decision is for the client ... whether re-
serving decision to the client would necessitate interrupting tri-
als or constant consultations; whether reasonable persons would
disagree about how the decision should be made; and whether
the lawyer's interests may conflict with the client's. 58
54. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N, COMMENTS, supra note 45.
55. The California Supreme Court held that a lawyer may not opt for arbitration
against the client's wishes. Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1985). In a
concurring, opinion, Justice Bird stated, "An attorney should explain to the client the
strategic considerations that determine whether a jury trial or some other form of
dispute resolution should be utilized." Id. at 656 (Bird, Chief J., concurring).
56. Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33(1) (1998)
(emphasis added).
58. Id. cmt. e.
912
PROFESSIONAL RULES AND ADR
Each of these factors suggests that the decision to pursue ADR
should belong to the client:
(1) "how important the decision is for the client": As sug-
gested earlier in this article, the decision whether to pursue
ADR is a very important decision for the client. ADR can save
time and attorney's fees, reduce hostility between the parties,
and protect the client's privacy.5 9
(2) "whether reserving decision to the client would necessitate
interrupting trials or constant consultations": Reserving this de-
cision to the client would not interrupt a trial or require constant
consultations. The decision whether to pursue ADR generally is
made a substantial time before trial.
(3) "whether reasonable persons would disagree about how
the decision should be made": There are advantages and disad-
vantages to the ADR options. Reasonable people can differ
over whether to pursue these options. The lawyer cannot know
how the client would choose and should present this issue to the
client.
(4) "whether the lawyer's interests may conflict with the cli-
ent's": As suggested previously, the lawyer and client are likely
to have conflicts of interest over this issue.6" Pursuing ADR
may conflict with lawyers' interest in high attorney's fees and
some lawyers' interest in maintaining a "hardball" image. Law-
yers who do not practice in the ADR area may have to give up a
case if a client chooses ADR.
Overall, it appears that under the Restatement, the client should be
entitled to decide whether to pursue ADR options.
As between an informed consent rule and a client control rule,
my preference, though not a strong one, is for a client control rule.
Under either rule, the lawyer must present ADR options to the
client, describe their advantages and disadvantages, and allow the
client to make the ultimate decision. But I believe that the in-
formed consent rule and the client control rule have significant dif-
ferences in emphasis. The label "informed consent" suggests that
the lawyer might merely seek the client's consent to the lawyer's
decision. The "client control" model properly focuses on the cli-
ent's control.
59. Supra Sections I.A, B.
60. Supra Section I.C.
20011 913
914 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
CONCLUSION
The ABA should amend the Model Rules to require lawyers to
present the option of pursuing ADR to the client. Whether to pur-
sue ADR is important to the client, the ability to make the decision
is likely to be within the competence of the client, and the lawyer is
likely to have a conflict of interest as to this issue. One of the at-
torney's primary functions is to protect client autonomy from inter-
ference by the state and other individuals. Attorneys should
enhance client autonomy; they should not be an additional source
of interference with that autonomy.
What would the result of such a rule be? I do not think that it
would put a great burden on lawyers. Standard forms for in-
structing clients about the various types of dispute resolution
would evolve. Lawyers would give such forms to clients as a part
of their standard package of client materials. Clients could look
such materials over at their leisure. Some clients who are not in-
formed of ADR options today would choose to pursue them.
ADR would be more heavily used, there would be less litigation
and less conflict within our society, and clients would have a
greater sense of control over their lives.




Arbitration is everywhere! Do you have a brokerage account?
If so, you have agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising out of or
relating to that brokerage relationship.' Have you purchased a
computer from Gateway? If so, you have agreed to arbitration-in
Chicago-pursuant to South Dakota law.2 Until recently, Gateway
contracts even mandated that arbitration proceedings be con-
ducted pursuant to the rules of the International Chamber of Com-
merce ("ICC"), including the requirement that all correspondence
be sent to ICC headquarters in Paris, France.3
Have you used a pest control service? You can probably guess
what the small print on the form you signed almost certainly says
about dispute resolution.4 Arbitration provisions are also now
standard in franchisor-franchisee contracts. For example, Subway
Sandwich Shop franchise disputes have generated dozens of law-
suits, virtually all of which have been decided in favor of the
franchisor 5 Have you or your child entered a contest by collecting
game pieces or participating in instant prize giveaways at fast food
* Stephen K. Huber is a Law Foundation Professor at the University of Houston
Law Center. Professor Huber received a B.A. from Earlham College, a J.D. from the
University of Chicago, and an LL.M. from Yale Law School. Research support from
the University of Houston Law Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
1. E.g., E*Trade Customer Agreement (2001), http://www.etrade.com/cgi-bin/gx.
cgi/AppLogic+OpenAccount; Ameritrade Terms and Conditions (2001), http://www.
ameritrade.com/getting-started/apply-online.html.
2. Gateway Consumer Products Limited Warranty and Terms & Conditions
Agreement (1999), http://www.gateway.com/help/support/8505295.shtml.
3. Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App. Div. 1998) (finding pro-
vision requiring arbitration under rules of ICC to be "substantially unconscionable").
The International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") rules required consumers to pay
an advance fee of $4,000-an amount greater than the price of virtually all Gateway
products-of which, a $2,000 registration fee was nonrefundable even if the consumer
prevailed at the arbitration. Id. at 571.
4. E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (discussing
termite prevention contract specifying that any controversy under the contract would
be settled exclusively by arbitration).
5. E.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (preempting a
Montana notice requirement that contracts subject to arbitration so state in under-
lined capital letters on the first page of the contract). For a case study of the litigation
related to Doctor's Associates, Inc. ("DAI") arbitration provision and DAI's arbitra-
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chains? By now you will have guessed that any disputes relating to
such contests likely will be subject to arbitration.
Arbitration provisions are an increasingly common feature in
contracts between banks and their customers. Manufactured hous-
ing sales and financing contracts usually contain arbitration provi-
sions as well.6 Such terms also are increasingly common in real
estate contracts-including those between and among brokers, sell-
ers, buyers, and agencies.7 Arbitration provisions rapidly are be-
coming a standard feature of employment contracts, too.8
Mandatory arbitration provisions permeate relationships in the
health industry-including those among patients, employers, physi-
cians, HMOs, 9 PPOs,10 and insurance companies." Of direct inter-
est to readers of this essay, arbitration terms are now common in
agreements between lawyers and clients, as well as between law-
yers and their firms.' 2
tion and litigation strategy, see STEPHEN K. HUBER & E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER,
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 199-224 (1998).
6. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513, 518 (2000) (discussing
provision requiring that all contract disputes pertaining to housing finance agree-
ments be resolved through binding arbitration).
7. See, e.g., Buyer's First Realty v. Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors, CV-339578,
2000 WL 1060527, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2000) (affirming arbitration award in
action between real estate brokerage and its agents).
8. E.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (uphold-
ing a provision requiring mandatory arbitration of an Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act claim). The Justices also stated that they were "unpersuaded by the
argument that arbitration [would] undermine ... the ADEA." Id. at 28.
9. Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") provide medical coverage to
the insured at lower cost than traditional methods, often without patient deductibles.
HMO plans typically require, however, that the insured choose a physician from a
specific network of doctors and obtain referral before seeing specialists. PREMIER FIN.
BENEFITS, LLC, HMO v. PPO, at http://www.premierhealthplans.com/hmovsppo.htm.
10. Preferred Provider Organizations differ from HMO plans in that the insured
may choose any physician she wishes, however, the PPO often will pay a higher per-
centage of the costs if a doctor is chosen from the company's list. Id.
11. E.g., Group Health Plan, Inc. v. BJC Health Systems, 30 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2000) (holding that confidential information from prior arbitration was not
discoverable in present, unrelated arbitration between health services corporation
and health care provider). "Though we recognize that arbitrators enjoy wide latitude
in granting discovery ... [t]o permit arbitrators to conduct illimitable discovery ...
would have a chilling effect on the willingness of parties to arbitrate their disputes."
Id.
12. E.g., Sage v. Greenspan, No. 1413, 2000 WL 1855141 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 20,
2000) (holding that in a malpractice action, statutory procedure prevailed over provi-
sions of arbitration agreement). For a greater collection of cases involving arbitration
in the legal and medical contexts, see STEPHEN K. HUBER & E. WENDY TRACHTE-
HUBER, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 681-700 (1998).
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The statement that arbitration is everywhere somewhat exagger-
ates realty. One place where arbitration notably is absent is the
curriculum of the modern American law school. Because this essay
is based on a presentation to a joint session of the Association of
American Law Schools ("AALS") Sections on Professional Re-
sponsibility and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 13 my focus will be
on some particularly interesting ethics issues that frequently arise
in the arbitration context.
The main topic I address, by way of raising ethics issues that may
arise in arbitration, is the role of the arbitrator. Arbitrators com-
monly are referred to as private judges, but there are major differ-
ences between arbitrators and judges-two of which are central to
this discussion:
1. Arbitrators are commonly selected, either directly or indi-
rectly, by the parties involved in the dispute; and
2. Individuals are commonly chosen as arbitrators precisely
because they have considerable knowledge about the sub-
ject matter of the arbitration, or because they are the lead-
ing experts in the industry.
These factors require the background of arbitrators to be quite dif-
ferent from that of judges. Although judges all have been trained
as lawyers-in addition to acquiring extensive professional experi-
ence-many arbitrators are not lawyers and have little if any legal
training. Yet, if adjudicatory finality is the benchmark standard,
arbitrators have greater judicial power than civil trial judges be-
cause the nature and extent of judicial review under the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") 4 and the Uniform Arbitration Act
("UAA")1 5 is more restrictive than appellate review of trial court
decisions.
A basic understanding of the differences between arbitration
and litigation is important for anyone who works with civil clients.
In addition, the differences between arbitrators and judges raise
13. The other essays based on presentations at this Symposium, ADR and the Pro-
fessional Responsibility of Lawyers, are reported within this volume of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal.
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
15. The UAA was approved by the House of Delegates to the American Bar As-
sociation in 1955 and has been "reprinted by the American Arbitration Association
... for the assistance of legislators, lawyers, and others who wish to improve the
arbitration legislation in their own states." Uniform Arbitration Act, http://www.adr.
org/law/federal/uniform.html. For the most recent revisions to the Act, see UNIF. AR-
BITRATION AcT (revised 2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/
arbitrat1213.pdf.
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important professional ethics issues about the neutrality of arbitra-
tors-neutrality being the hallmark of the adjudicative process.
I. THE PLACE OF ARBITRATION IN THE
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
Before turning to the appropriate role for arbitrators, attention
must be given to arbitration in context of the law school enterprise.
Both the professoriate and law students alike are largely ignorant
of arbitration and the extraordinary expansion of its relevance in
recent years.
Recently, I made a presentation to my colleagues at the Univer-
sity of Houston ("UH") Law Center about the many important ar-
bitration developments during the 1990s. Borrowing from late
night television host David Letterman, I structured those develop-
ments in the form of a "Top 10" list.16 To gauge the background of
my audience, I asked some twenty of my compatriots what they
had learned about arbitration in law school. Their answers ranged
from "nothing" all the way to "absolutely nothing." My own an-
swer was that I, too, had learned nothing about arbitration. Only
one of my faculty colleagues, Ron Turner, recalled more than a
passing mention of arbitration while in law school-and he prac-
ticed and now teaches labor and employment law.1 7
Law professors, like others, tend to forget some of the lessons
they learned in school-even when their instructor may have
presented the material in a brilliant and amusing manner. To en-
sure against such lapses in memory, and also to avoid reporting
ancient history, my sample of the UH Law Center faculty was
heavily skewed toward more recent law school graduates.
This initial-and purposely unthreatening-question facilitated
a general discussion of what law school faculties know about arbi-
tration and the place of arbitration in the law school curriculum.
The overall level of knowledge claimed by my faculty colleagues
was minimal, although this may reflect undue modesty on their
part. As might be expected, knowledge about arbitration tended
to be greatest among faculty who taught in subject areas where the
use of arbitration is most common: labor, employment, consumer,
patent, and international commercial transactions. Notably, none
of these areas are at the core of the law school curriculum.
16. For the complete version, see Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber,
Top Ten Developments in Arbitration in the 1990s, 55 Disp. RESOL. J. 24 (2001).
17. Indeed, Turner's comments refreshed my recollection that arbitration had re-
ceived brief attention in my own labor law course.
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Law students receive little, if any, exposure to arbitration during
their legal education; this is particularly true in first-year courses.
The obvious place in the first-year curriculum to find arbitration is
in the contracts course. A sampling of the leading casebooks
turned up little arbitration material, so it would take an affirmative
effort on the part of a contracts teacher to provide even a general
introduction to the subject of arbitration. An overview of the very
modest coverage provided in contracts casebooks is found in the
Appendix to this essay.
Civil procedure casebooks commonly address alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") topics, but the focus is on procedures that
serve as adjuncts to litigation rather than alternatives to trial
courts. 18 A striking exception is the civil procedure casebook used
at Columbia Law School.1 9 Rather than focusing on ADR within
the litigation process, this casebook devotes nearly the entire ADR
chapter to private arbitration. The authors offer the following ex-
planation: "Of all the alternatives... the one that comes closest to
the normal adjudicative process is arbitration .... Because arbitra-
tion is so close to adjudication in many of its major characteristics,
it serves as a mirror that reflects the strengths and weaknesses of
court process. ' 20
II. TEACHING ARBITRATOR CONFLICTS ISSUES IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Arbitration practices, as they pertain to professional responsibil-
ity issues, are as absent from professional responsibility courses as
they are from the rest of the law school curriculum.21 Professional
ethics courses already have a considerable body of material to
cover, often within a two-credit course, so suggestions for addi-
tional curricular material are offered with certain diffidence. Fo-
cus, however, on the role of the arbitrator and conflicts of interest
18. The most recent editions of civil procedure casebooks contain materials on
mediation, in the context of the judicial process, but not about arbitration as an alter-
native to law suits. Court-Annexed Arbitration ("CAA") receives some mention, but
CAA is part of the trial process rather than an alternative thereto.
19. MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th ed.
1990).
20. Id. at 1111. There is also a four-page section on the enforcement of foreign
arbitration awards in American courts. Id. at 1132-35.
21. The goal in the discussion that follows is to offer material for understanding
the role of the arbitrator and conflicts of interest-it does not assume any knowledge
about arbitration law or practice.
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is useful in law school because it illuminates those parallel issues
for lawyers generally, as well as for judges.
It is helpful when teaching professional ethics to have a widely
accepted set of rules of conduct, which provide a basis for consider-
ing specific problems and issues. Fortunately, such a set of rules
for arbitrators exists and is widely cited by the courts-the Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes ("Code of Ethics"),
jointly promulgated by the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") and the American Bar Association ("ABA").2" The
AAA also has adopted a parallel set of rules for labor disputes-
the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators in Labor-
Management Disputes.3
III. THE "EVIDENT PARTIALITY" STANDARD FOR VACATING
ARBITRATION AWARDS
Arbitration statutes provide for vacating arbitration awards due
to unacceptable conflicts of interest on the part of arbitrators.24
The relevant provisions in both the FAA and the UAA for vacating
an award due to arbitrator bias cites "evident partiality or corrup-
tion. '2 5 Thus, short of actual corruption on the part of an arbitra-
tor, the governing legal standard is "evident partiality." The
meaning of this phrase is hardly self-evident, which allows for lively
debate about what content should be placed in this vessel.
The United States Supreme Court has made only one foray into
the evident partiality thicket, in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co.26 Not only is more recent guidance from
the high Court lacking, but Commonwealth produced a plurality
opinion by Justice Black and an often quoted concurring opinion
by Justice White. The Court adopted an "impression of possible
22. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N & AM. BAR Ass'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRA-
TION IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977), available at http://www.adr.org [hereinafter
CODE OF ETHICS]. The Code of Ethics was revised in 1999 by a Committee convened
by the Arbitration Committee of the Section of Dispute Resolution of the American
Bar Association and including representatives of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion and CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. The revised Code of Ethics is available
at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/dispute/arbdoc.txt (last visited March 27, 2001).
23. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N ET AL., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES (1985), http://www.adr.org/
rules/ethics/laborcode.html (last visited March 27, 2001).
24. Although there are typically one to three arbitrators, in theory, the parties can
specify any number of arbitrators. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
25. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
26. 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968) (stating that it was the desire of Congress to "provide
not merely for any arbitration but for an impartial one") (emphasis in original).
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bias" test, which hardly clarifies matters.217 For subsequent case
law, one may turn to other federal, but most likely state, courts.
Many cases arising under the FAA are heard by state courts be-
cause the FAA, unlike many federal statutes, does not provide an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
In his Commonwealth concurrence, Justice White elaborated on
the appropriate standards for vacating arbitration awards due to
arbitrator bias:
The Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held
to the standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or in-
deed of any judges. It is often because they are men of affairs,
not apart from but of the marketplace, that they are effective in
their adjudicatory function. This does not mean that the judici-
ary must overlook outright chicanery in giving effect to their
awards; that would be an abdication of our responsibility. But it
does mean that arbitrators are not automatically disqualified by
a business relationship with the parties before them if both par-
ties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if they are
unaware of the facts but the relationship is trivial. I see no rea-
son automatically to disqualify the best informed and most capa-
ble potential arbitrators. 8
The differences between the appropriate background of judges
and arbitrators, and their impact on the adjudicatory process, are
highlighted nicely by Judge Richard Posner:
The ethical obligations of arbitrators can be understood only
by reference to the fundamental differences between adjudica-
tion by arbitrators and adjudication by judges and jurors. No
one is forced to arbitrate a commercial dispute unless he has
consented by contract to arbitrate. The voluntary nature of
commercial arbitration is an important safeguard for the parties
that is missing in the case of the courts. Courts are coercive, not
voluntary, agencies ... [resulting] in a judicial system in which
impartiality is prized above expertise .... [Pleople who arbi-
trate do so because they prefer a tribunal knowledgeable about
the subject matter of their dispute to a generalist court with its
austere impartiality but limited knowledge of the subject matter.
... There is a tradeoff between impartiality and expertise. The
expert adjudicator is more likely than a judge or jury not only to
be precommitted to a particular substantive position but to
know or have heard of the parties (or if the parties are organiza-
tions, their key people). "Expertise in an industry is accompa-
27. Id. at 149-50.
28. Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
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nied by exposure, in ways large and small, to those who are
engaged in it .... 29
Another factor that places pressure on the "evident partiality"
standard is the fact that judicial review of arbitration awards is ex-
tremely limited-clearly more limited than review of trial court de-
cisions. The result is a form of the phenomenon known as
displacement. Losing parties are dissatisfied with the result of the
arbitration, but the possibility of vacatur for errors of fact or law is
extremely modest, so the only remaining option is to challenge the
neutrality of an arbitrator. As a result, losing parties in arbitration
closely examine the backgrounds of their arbitrators in search of
undisclosed conflicts. Of course, judges are acutely aware of the
motives underlying such hindsight, but the search sometimes turns
up information that could have seriously undermined neutrality.
Such situations put into conflict the goals of finality, certainty,
and expert decisions on the one hand, and neutrality on the other.
In addition, arbitrators are directly or indirectly, selected by the
parties-something inconceivable with state-supplied courts. Party
choice is an independent value. Therefore, neutrality is arguably
less important in arbitration, where the parties choose their judges,
than in court proceedings, where the state provides the judge.
A further-but less important-reason not to vacate an arbitra-
tion award is that the entire process must be started anew, which is
often not the case with courts. Courts have an institutional exis-
tence, while arbitration panels are ad hoc bodies. A court cannot
remand a decision to the arbitrators for clarification, and they can-
not ask the arbitrators to reconsider one of several issues-the
common affirm in part and reverse/remand in part decision. This
fact is known as the doctrine of functus officio.30 Not too much
should be made of this difference, but it does mean that reviewing
courts have less flexibility in reviewing an arbitration award than in
reviewing a court decision.
There is an obvious solution to concerns about bias situations.
Potential arbitrators should disclose everything of any conceivable
interest to the parties after a complete conflicts check that includes
the parties, counsel, and witnesses. If this is done, a party must
29. Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 701 (2d Cir.
1978)).
30. "Of an officer or official body without authority or legal competence because
the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully accomplished."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 682 (7th ed. 1999).
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make a timely objection before the arbitration takes place, or
waive its objection. This approach is easy to articulate but difficult
to implement in practice. The practical question faced by a court is
whether to vacate an arbitration award due to bias. The wrong-
doer is the nondisclosing arbitrator; the injured party is the prevail-
ing party in arbitration. A similar problem arises when a trial court
is reversed, but this rarely happens because of a trial judge's failure
to recuse herself.
In light of a very general governing standard-evident partial-
ity-severe consequences of vacatur, important disclosure values,
and circumstances in which strategic behavior by the parties is to
be expected, the reader might expect that the case law is inconsis-
tent and reflects a variety of underlying values. That is in fact the
state of the law.31
On the off chance that the consideration of issues related to evi-
dent partiality has not sated the reader's appetite for professional
responsibility problems related to the role of the arbitrator, let me
offer an introduction to three additional sets of issues: structural
bias (particularly in contracts of adhesion), party arbitrators, and
hybrid arbitration/mediation proceedings. Each of these issues
provides additional sauce for the proverbial goose.
IV. STRUCTURAL BIAS (PARTICULARLY IN
ADHESION CONTRACTS)
Arbitrator bias determinations. are difficult enough in the ordi-
nary course of things because of the expertise and industry back-
ground that arbitrators possess. In the courtroom context, parties
have no input in the selection of persons who judge their dispute,
and they certainly are not permitted to specify the qualifications of
judges by contract. We already 'have seen that arbitrator expertise
is an. important feature of the arbitration process, but neutrality
also is expected. Suppose, however, that the qualification of the
arbitrator appears to favor -one of the parties-how far can the
contract be used to specify the background of an arbitrator? To a
certain extent, expertise-certainly, compared to a jury trial-fa-
vors commercial entities over individuals.
Injured tort claimants provide a good example, notably in medi-
cal malpractice or informed consent cases, because the situation is
31. For examples of well-reasoned opinions that reflect different philosophies and
reach opposite results, compare Merit, 714 F.2d at 673 (arbitration award confirmed),
with Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1997) (arbitration
award vacated).
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familiar to law students and requires no background knowledge
about arbitration. Suppose that the contract calls for arbitration by
a mutually agreeable person, but that the arbitrator must be a med-
ical care professional (a defined term)? Should courts enforce a
term that requires the arbitrator to be a physician? May the con-
tract specify that the physician must be a specialist in the same field
as the doctor against whom the patient has a claim?
An answer to some of these questions can be found by examina-
tion of specific contract arrangements. For example, some con-
tracts between RE/MAX, the national real estate firm, and its sales
agents provided that disputes would be settled by three RE/MAX
brokers selected by management.32 An Oklahoma court refused to
uphold this arbitration arrangement, analogizing it to having foxes
assigned to guard the rabbits.33
A similar arbitration provision is used by BDO Seidman, the na-
tional accounting firm, in contracts between the firm and its part-
ners.34 Disputes are to be settled through arbitration, with the
panel of arbitrators composed of five BDO partners, three of
whom must be BDO directors.35 There are four decisions that
have considered this approach, and three have ordered that the dis-
pute be settled in arbitration.36 The only court that refused to or-
der arbitration found BDO to be judging its contract, thus
determining the outcome of its own dispute.37
This BDO situation is of particular interest because, unlike real
estate brokers or purchasers of Gateway computers, it cannot be
argued that partners in accounting firms lack choices or the ability
to understand contracts. Similar provisions now are found in con-
tracts between law firms and their lawyers in Houston, and I am
confident that the same is true in cities throughout the country.
Also of interest are contract provisions that come close to al-
lowing one party to the contract to be the arbitrator of product
quality. Perhaps the leading case involved the purchase by the
New York City Transit Authority ("NYCTA") of expensive equip-
32. Ditto v. RE/MAX Preferred Properties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1993)
33. Id. at 1003.
34. BDO Seidman v. Miller, 949 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tex. App. 1.997).
35. Id.
36. HuBER & TRACHTE-HUBER, supra note 5, at 390-93 (comparing BDO Seid-
man, 949 S.W.2d at 861, with three unpublished opinions).
37. Id.
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ment from Westinghouse.38 The contract provided that the chief
electrical officer of the NYCTA would be the sole arbiter of issues
arising under the contract, and that his decision was final and bind-
ing.39 A unanimous New York Court of Appeals upheld this ap-
proach.40 This decision could be read as limited to government
contracts-whether it should be so read, at least in the context of
sophisticated commercial parties, is itself an interesting question.
One common contractual approach used for the selection of ar-
bitrators in the event of a dispute is for each party to pick one
person, and then those two individuals select a third arbitrator who
becomes the chair of the panel. All three arbitrators are neutrals,
but one can wonder about the nature and extent of neutrality
where an arbitrator was selected by one of the parties. Neutrality,
however, may have a structural and a factual component. Suppose
in a labor dispute that management picks the vice-president for
human relations at another firm, and the union selects an official
from a different union. Alternatively, in a construction dispute, the
prime contractor might select another prime while the subcontrac-
tor selects a fellow sub. There may be a strong disposition by each
of the arbitrators toward the appointing party, but still a willing-
ness to be persuaded by the facts. The expertise that the arbitra-
tors would bring to the proceeding relates to labor-management
disputes in general, but not necessarily to that dispute in particular.
It is reasonable to call such persons "neutrals," but neutrality
means something different from what that term commonly is taken
to mean in the judicial context.
V. PARTY ARBITRATORS: "NON-NEUTRAL" NEUTRALS
As if the approach of parties appointing "neutral" arbitrators is
not sufficiently dissonant to those accustomed to thinking about
neutrality in terms of judges and juries, let us now turn our atten-
tion to a model unique to American arbitration: the "party-ap-
pointed" arbitrator. In the party-appointed arbitrator model, each
party appoints one arbitrator and those arbitrators jointly select
the third arbitrator. "Party arbitrators," however, are not neutral;
instead they are permitted to be-indeed, they are expected to
38. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 623 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y.
1993).
39. Id. at 532.
40. Id. at 536.
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be-biased toward the appointing party." Under the AAA/ABA
Code of Ethics, a party arbitrator may be "predisposed" toward the
appointing party. 2 The nature and extent of permissible bias al-
lowed under the rubric "predisposed" is a good discussion topic.
In effect, the use of party arbitrators produces an arbitration
proceeding with a single neutral arbitrator-with party advocates
in the room with the judge, instead of outside as in the judicial
process. Why bother, particularly in view of the added cost and
complexity associated with adding two non-neutral arbitrators
whose influence and votes will almost certainly cancel out each
other? Such a question does not reflect a piercing objection in a
market economy. If rational maximizers regard the party-arbitra-
tor approach as a good way to spend their funds, it is not the place
of government to second-guess them-unless, of course, that ap-
proach is inimical to important social values. This topic is likely to
generate heated debate among those interested in the law and per-
haps shed some light on the nature of appropriate dispute
resolution.
The AAA/ABA Code of Ethics requires that party arbitrators
disclose relevant interests and relationships, but the disclosures
"need not include as detailed information as is expected from per-
sons appointed as neutral arbitrators."43 Conflict of interest re-
strictions are inapplicable to the appointment process, and the
existence of even a severe conflict of interest does not provide the
basis for a motion to recuse a party arbitrator. In short, conflicts
are not a bar to serving as an arbitrator, so long as they are
disclosed.
A party arbitrator may communicate with the appointing party,
but not even the nature, let alone the precise contents, of these ex
parte communications need be revealed to the other party or the
other arbitrators. Prior notice for such communications must be
given to the other party and arbitrators, but the AAA/ABA Code
of Ethics expressly authorizes blanket notice for future communi-
cations. 4 In this context, the initial notice requirement seems to
be at best a needless formality and at worst a potential trap for the
unwary.
41. Outside the United States, the use of arbitrators appointed by the parties is
common enough, but such arbitrators are always neutrals.
42. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMER-
CIAL DISPUTES Cannon 7(A)(1), (E)(1) (1998).
43. Id. at (B)(1).
44. Id. at (C)(2).
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A different approach was adopted in the interesting case of Bar-
con Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., where the New
Jersey Supreme Court, by a 4-3 vote, ruled that party arbitrators
are subject to the same "evident partiality" standards as other arbi-
trators.45 The court ruled that the same standards must govern the
conduct of all arbitrators, including party arbitrators. 46 Accord-
ingly, the court required that every arbitrator, neutral or party-des-
ignated, must make full disclosure of all possible conflicts of
interest to the parties prior to commencement of arbitration
proceedings.47
The New York Court of Appeals rejected this disclosure stan-
dard for party arbitrators.48 In an opinion by Judge Stanley Fuld,
the court stated that an attack on an arbitration award based on
"evident partiality" "must be based on something overt, some mis-
conduct on the part of the arbitrator, and not simply on his interest
in the subject matter of the controversy or his relationship to the
party who selected him."49
The dissenting opinion in Barcon took a moral position different
from the majority. It stated that:
Party-designated arbitrators are not expected to approach the
dispute with the impartiality of a neutral arbitrator. Indeed, the
partisanship of the party-designated arbitrator is perceived as an
advantage of the tripartite system, ensuring that each party's po-
sition will be adequately presented and pressed before the
panel.... The Court's error... results both from a misguided
sense of commercial morality and a mistaken notion of sound
public policy. Its morality consists of the proposition that there
is something inherently evil in allowing party-designated arbitra-
tors to participate in the resolution of disputes when they may
be partial to the party that selected them. The truth is that there
is nothing wrong with it at all.50
There must be some limits on the behavior of party arbitrators,
but these limits are not easily stated. Most fundamentally, arbitra-
tors should be willing to listen to the facts of a particular dispute
with an open, even if predisposed, mind. However, because com-
mercial arbitration awards are not normally accompanied by a
statement of reasons, the behavior of party and other arbitrators is
45. 430 A.2d 214, 224 (N.J. 1981).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Astoria Med. Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 182 N.E.2d 85, 89 (N.Y. 1962).
49. Id.
50. 430 A.2d at 227 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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difficult to monitor. Even reasoned arbitration awards are cursory
by the standards of appellate courts. Perhaps the more appropriate
comparison is with trial courts, which often do not produce written
opinions.
Party arbitrators typically are compensated by the appointing
party, and no disclosure about payments is made to the other party.
One party arbitrator who represented claimants in disputes with
insurance companies charged a contingent fee-ten percent of the
amount awarded. 51 When questioned, the arbitrator readily admit-
ted what he was doing, and said he had been using this approach
for some time. The Rhode Island Supreme Court was deeply of-
fended by the arbitrator's fee approach, but nevertheless con-
firmed the underlying award because the insurance company failed
to demonstrate that the wrongful conduct of the party arbitrator
was prejudicial.52
VI. ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION HYBRID PROCEEDINGS
Arbitration and mediation may be used as successive processes.
The key issue to be considered here is whether a single individual,
consistent with rules of professional ethics, may or should serve in
both capacities in the same dispute between the same parties. It is
readily apparent that two different people can perform the two
roles in succession. To avoid problems related to adhesion con-
tracts or disparity of knowledge/wealth/power between parties, it
should be assumed that both parties are sophisticated commercial
entities that are represented by competent counsel. Quite different
issues arise depending on whether arbitration or mediation takes
place first.53
Serial arbitration and mediation proceedings before the same ar-
bitrator tend to happen in steps-the neutral is asked to serve in a
dual capacity only after the first process is under way, if not com-
pleted. Where the contract with the arbitrator provides for se-
quential processes, the neutral will be in breach of contract if she
refuses to continue to the end. If a neutral refuses on principle to
serve in multiple capacities in the context of a single dispute, that
fact might be communicated to the parties, preferably in writing,
by the neutral before agreeing to serve.
51. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 96 (R.I. 1991).
52. Id.
53. The discussion here is limited to two simple models, but parties sometimes
design fancier approaches that combine decisional and facilitative dispute resolution
processes.
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A. Arbitration Followed by Mediation ("Arb-Med")
In Arb-Med, the third-party neutral hears the dispute in the
same manner as with conventional arbitration. She renders an
award that is placed in a sealed envelope, but is not disclosed to the
parties, whereupon the neutral then conducts a conventional medi-
ation. If a settlement is reached, that ends the matter. Subsequent
disclosure of the superceded arbitration award is likely to produce
unhappiness from at least one party to the dispute, but the parties
do have the contractual power to specify disclosure. If no settle-
ment is reached, the initial arbitration award is used to decide the
dispute.
Can an attorney ethically serve as a mediator when she knows
what the result will be if the mediation fails? If the answer is no,
the consequence may be that similarly situated parties turn to non-
lawyer neutrals instead. What would you advise a colleague about
whether to serve in both roles? Before too quickly responding
"under no circumstances," consider that the situation arises only
because the commercial parties have asked the individual to serve
in both roles. Suppose that the parties argue to the neutral that she
signed on to help them find a quick solution, and now she is back-
ing out of that commitment. In addition, the parties can point out
that they have just spent a considerable amount of money-per-
haps several hundred thousand dollars-in educating the neutral
about this dispute, so that employing a second neutral would entail
substantial expense and delay. Finally, issues of securing repeat
business and professional reputation must be considered-do not
let students too easily be "holier than thou" while ignoring basic
economic reality.
B. Mediation Followed by Arbitration ("Med-Arb")
In Med-Arb, the third-party neutral mediates the dispute with-
out the parties reaching an agreement. The neutral then becomes
an arbitrator, with each party presenting its case in the same man-
ner as an ordinary arbitration proceeding.54 In practice, the hear-
ing is likely to be somewhat truncated, and the decision rendered
more rapidly because the neutral learned a great deal about the
54. For an illustration, see Al-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
When this mediation-between commercial parties with millions of dollars at stake-
did not result in a settlement, the neutral (Kenneth R. Feinberg, of Agent Orange
fame) recommended several persons to serve as arbitrator. However, consideration of
cost and the desire for a faster decision caused the parties to prefer to continue with
Feinberg as arbitrator.
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dispute during the mediation phase. Here, the central ethical issue
is that the neutral surely received important confidential, ex parte
communications during the mediation. How does the neutral put
this information out of her mind during the arbitration process?
How does she ensure that her questioning of the parties does not
reflect confidential information that was obtained during the medi-
ation phase? As with Arb-Med, consent of the parties is not an
issue; failure to serve in both roles results in money and delay costs
to the parties; and the neutral may sacrifice future work.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration is everywhere in the American economic scene-ex-
cept in the law schools. When a conservative institution like the
law welcomes the explosive growth of arbitration in all segments of
economic activity, and does so through the vehicle of conventional
contract doctrine, it seems that the legal education establishment
should take note.
Arbitration presents important professional responsibility issues
for arbitrators and for those who represent clients in arbitration
proceedings. This essay is limited to an examination of one class of
such arbitration ethics issues: conflict of interest problems faced by
persons who fill, or are being considered to serve in, the role of
arbitrator. These and other arbitration issues should be part of the
education of future lawyers.
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APPENDIX
ARBITRATION IN CONTRACTS CASEBOOKS
Contracts casebooks give only modest attention to arbitration, at
least if the indexes accurately reflect their contents. Although
some contracts teachers may supplement these arbitration materi-
als, it seems plausible to conclude that American law students gen-
erally emerge from the first year of law school with only the
skimpiest knowledge about arbitration law and practice. The
casebooks are considered in alphabetical order, by author, with
page references in parenthesis.
1. Randy E. Barnett, Contracts: Cases and Doctrine
(2d ed. 1999).
The index lists three entries for arbitration. The book states that
''many commercial contracts contain clauses that give one or both
parties the right to have the dispute, including the proper measure
of damages, settled by arbitration or what is now referred to as
alternative dispute resolution (ADR)" (170). A section is devoted
to "Punitive Damages and Arbitration Clauses" (188-209). Garrity
v. Stuart, 353 N.E.2d 973 (N.Y. 1976) is the main case, with no indi-
cation that it presents a minority rule, or that it is of only modest
impact today due to federal preemption of state law related to arbi-
tration. A contrary case is excerpted at length-though it was de-
cided by a U.S. district court judge in 1984. The last item is an
extensive excerpt from a wonderful article about arbitration in the
diamond industry.
2. E. Allan Farnsworth & William E. Young, Cases and
Materials on Contracts (5th ed. 1995).
The opening chapter contains a brief discussion of arbitration
(41-43). Reference also is made to the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration
Rules, but not the FAA, UAA, or state arbitration statutes. Ques-
tions are raised about the remedial powers of arbitrators by asking
the student to assume that there was an arbitration clause in the
contracts at issue in two earlier cases. A similar question is raised
later in the context of a liquidated damages clause (562).
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3. Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law
(6th ed. 1996).
The index does not contain an arbitration entry. The topic of
arbitration appears to go unmentioned, a particularly striking omis-
sion in view of Professor Fuller's extensive writings about arbitra-
tion. Indeed, Fuller's original 1947 edition of this casebook
presented a typical arbitration award, followed by a comment on
"The Role of Lawyers in Commercial Arbitration" (711-13). In ad-
dition, the General Conditions of the Contract for the Construction
of Buildings, published by the American Institute of Architects
("AIA") on the role of the architect and arbitration of disputes,
was quoted at length (807-809).
4. Robert W. Hamilton, Alan Scott Rau, & Russel J. Weintraub,
Contracts: Cases and Materials (2d ed. 1992).
This book does not consider arbitration at all. This is quite sur-
prising given its second and third authors' experience. Alan Rau is
a noted arbitration scholar and the author of a leading ADR
casebook, and Russell Weintraub also has written about
arbitration.
5. Friedrich Kessler, Grant Gilmore, & Anthony T. Kronman,
Contracts: Cases and Materials (3d ed. 1986).
Arbitration is not an entry in the index. The chapter on reme-
dies includes a section that addresses "The Power of the Parties to
Control Risk and Remedies." The major topics are liquidated
damages clauses and limitations on remedies, with the last includ-
ing arbitration (1210-23). The primary case is Garrity v. Stuart, 353
N.E.2d 973 (N.Y. 1976), holding that arbitrators may not award
punitive damages. Students are not informed, however, that the
New York view is the clear minority position.
The notes focus on Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products,
Corp., 237 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1968) (1221), which rules that antitrust
allegations present public policy issues that preclude arbitration.
This is not the law today. Securities claims are said not to be arbi-
trable, citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which was over-
ruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989) (after publication of this casebook). Brief
mention is made of the FAA, but nothing would alert the reader to
the existence of the UAA, or that every American jurisdiction has
adopted a comprehensive arbitration statute.
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6. Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal, & Harry G. Prince,
Problems in Contract Law: Cases and Materials
(4th ed. 1999).
The 1993 edition of this casebook was limited to a three-page
section titled "Commercial Arbitration" (1131-34); this material is
repeated in the latest edition (1203-06). The materiality, vel non,
of arbitration provisions in the context of the battle of the forms,
UCC § 2-207, receives brief mention (317). There are several other
references to arbitration that are not listed in the index. (This is
the one current contracts casebook that I have read closely from
end to end, because I teach from it.)
Most strikingly, the very first case in the book is one that focuses
on arbitration at length (18-38, including comments and a prob-
lem). Why the authors selected this admittedly "complicated case
with many different legal issues" by an Alabama trial judge is quite
beyond me (28). This material is too difficult, and requires too
much background, to use at the start of an upper-division arbitra-
tion course, let alone for the first week of the first year of law
school. In addition, the arbitration decisions of the Alabama state
and federal courts are inconsistent, messy, and just plain weird.
7. Stewart Macaulay et al., Contracts: Law in Action (1995).
Arbitration is addressed in the context of a section titled:
"Grievance Processes Under Collective Bargaining" (350-58); and
commercial arbitration is discussed briefly (421-23). The subject is
revisited as an option in addressing the Westinghouse uranium con-
tracts (1144-45).
8. John E. Murray, Contracts: Cases and Materials
(5th ed. 2000).
Arbitration is not mentioned in the quite detailed-for teaching
materials-index.
9. Arthur Rosett, Contract Law and its Application
(5th ed. 1994).
The chapter on remedies closes with a section on arbitration
(502-19). An arbitration decision is included in the chapter on per-
sonal services contracts (959).
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10. Roberi' S. Summers & Robert A. Hillman, Contract and
Related Obligations: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice
(4th ed. 2001).
This casebook includes only two items related to arbitration: one
is badly out of date, and not even the best piece of work by the
author, and the other offers dreadful advice about arbitration.
There is a reasonably lengthy (for a casebook) excerpt from an ar-
ticle about arbitration by Soia Mentschikoff published in 1954
(352-55). Surely something more recent could be found, although
Dean Mentschikoff's Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
846 (1961) still merits the attention of readers with a serious inter-
est in arbitration.
The second foray into arbitration offers an "illustrative arbitra-
tion clause" (371-72). It begins, "All questions subject to arbitra-
tion under this contract shall be submitted to arbitration at the
choice of either party to the dispute." (The ensuing paragraphs
deal with the selection of arbitrators, and a few other matters re-
lated to the arbitration proceeding.) Because nothing is said about
what disputes are subject to arbitration, the illustrative arbitration
clause is without effect. Use of this approach in a contract would
subject a lawyer to malpractice liability.
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TRANSFORMING LAWYER ETHICS FOR




And no one puts new wine into old wineskins; or else the new
wine will burst the wineskins and be spilled, and the wineskins
will be ruined. But new wine must be put into new wineskins, and
both are preserved.1
INTRODUCTION
The new wine of mediation must have new wineskins, lest it not
ferment and sour, left incapable of achieving its full potential. Yet
we have assumed that we can merely pour the new wine into the
old wineskins of litigation, advocacy, and adversariness, and that it
will come of age and endure. Such is not the case. When a new
wine is introduced, whether a new vintage or varietal, by its very
nature a new wineskin is required. So, too, with the field of alter-
native dispute resolution ("ADR"), in particular mediation.2 The
wineskins are those parameters that shape lawyers' conduct, com-
monly ethical guidelines or rules.3
This essay specifically examines the role of the lawyer represen-
tative in the mediation process. The focus is not on lawyers who
* Professor Kovach received a B.S. from Ohio State University and a J.D. from
Capital University School of Law in Columbus, Ohio. She currently teaches at the
University of Texas Law School, specializing in mediation and ADR, as well as di-
recting a mediation clinic. Special thanks to David Hricik and Nancy Rapoport for
helpful comments, to Kimberly Watts for her research assistance, and to Jacqueline
Nolan-Haley of Fordham University School of Law for her encouragement.
1. Luke 5:37-38 (New King James).
2. Note that some see alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") as merely old wine
in new wineskins. Infra note 53 and accompanying text.
3. I could not resist expanding on the wine analogy, as the talk giving rise to this
essay was presented at the Association of American Law Schools annual meeting in
San Francisco-only miles from Napa-Sonoma. I also wish to recognize that I am not
the first person to use this analogy in reference to ADR processes. E.g., Paul H.
Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory
Arbitration, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1039 (1998).
936 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
serve as neutrals,4 but rather those lawyers who find themselves
representing clients at the mediation table instead of in courtrooms
or at depositions. Although some attention has been paid to this
subject in the past,5 it often has been in making mediation sound
more "adversary like," by use of terms such as "mediation advo-
cate" and "winning at mediation."' 6 This essay stresses the impor-
tance of lawyers understanding and conforming to the appropriate
representative role in mediation, a process radically different from
the litigation paradigm.7
Part I of this essay provides an overview of the issues addressed
in the piece. Part II explores the inherent differences between me-
diation and litigation, otherwise referred to here as the adversary
system. In so doing, I also outline the various complications that
have resulted from the consumption of mediation by litigation.
Part III illustrates the background of current ethical standards for
lawyers, which originated and are housed in the adversary system.
Some of the problems that such an adversarial approach may
cause, even for those operating within such a paradigm, are high-
lighted. This section also examines the inapplicability of adver-
sarial approaches in lesser, or non-adversarial procedures. Part IV
questions the wisdom of employing only one code of ethics for all
4. For a discussion of lawyers serving as neutrals, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Silence of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyers as Only Ad-
versary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Silences of the Restatement], and Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Media-
tion Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 479 (2000). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in
ADR: The Many "Cs" of Professional Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979 (2001) (idenfitying four critical concerns in the practice of
ADR); Stephen K. Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflicts of Interest, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 915 (2001) (discussing conflicts of interest among arbitrators as well as the
failure of law schools to adequately address the subject).
5. Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Ec-
onomics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIo
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269 (1999) (calling for a flexible role and division of responsi-
bility between the lawyer and the client based, at least in part, on ascertaining the
needs of the client and the barriers to settlement). See also JOHN COOLEY, MEDIA-
TION ADVOCACY (1996); ERIC GALTON, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION
(1994); Peter Robinson, Contending With Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A Cautiously
Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 963 (1998).
6. The American Bar Association, through the Section on Dispute Resolution,
recently has instituted a mediation advocacy competition, which conducted its first
National Finals at the Section Annual Meeting in April 2000. To describe more accu-
rately the role of the lawyer, the Section entitled the competition "Representation in
Mediation." SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/dis-
pute/MediationComp.html.
7. Infra Part II.
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lawyers, particularly as law practice has diversified. The lack of
relevance of one code to varying practices is underscored and an
examination of the justification for new and separate ethics is pro-
vided. I then demonstrate the rationale for the development and
enactment of new and distinct rules of conduct for lawyers who
choose to represent clients in a non-adversarial forum such as me-
diation. Part V explores the elements of potential new rules, pro-
viding detail as to the specific types of guidelines that may be
established. Finally, Part VI raises additional questions and con-
cerns that such an approach will present and calls for additional
research and discussion of these difficult but necessary
considerations.
I. OVERVIEW
ADR8 has developed over the last twenty-five years to a point
where it is integrated within the legal system of jurisdictions
throughout the United States9 and abroad. 10 This development
was, at least in part, a response to observed problems within the
8. The term "ADR" is used to encompass a panoply of processes or fora for the
resolution of conflicts and disputes. As will be emphasized, this paper deals with only
one process specifically, that of mediation. With the advent of court-annexed ADR,
however, some confusion and blending of these processes has occurred, leading to a
debate about which process might be best suited for particular disputes, legal or oth-
erwise. For a discussion of the lawyer's role in assisting the client in selecting an ap-
propriate process, see Frank E.A. Sander and Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum
to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting An ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION
J. 49 (1994); see also Robert F. Cochran Jr., Professional Rules and ADR: Control of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal and
Other Professional Responsibility Standards, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895 (2001).
9. In Texas, for example, state courts may order parties to participate. Decker v.
Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (outlining the courts' ability to
compel litigants to participate in ADR). Courts have implemented such participation
in various ways. In many courts, the judge orders ADR on a case-by-case basis. Alter-
natively, Travis County, Texas, follows a standing order that mandates that litigants
participate in ADR in order to receive a setting for a jury trial. In Florida, the state
court system has had an institutionalized mediation program for a number of years.
James Alfini et al., What Happens When Mediation is Institutionalized?: To the Parties,
Practitioners, and Host Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 307, 307 (1994). In
the federal system, a number of methods for ongoing referral exist. E.g., Elizabeth S.
Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, ADR and Settlement in the Federal District Courts: A
Sourcebook for Lawyers & Judges (1996), available at http://www.fjc.gov/ALTDIS-
RES/adrsource/adrone.pdf; Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery
of ADR Services by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 715 (1999).
10. The ADR movement also spread to other countries. For a discussion of ADR
in Europe, see http://www.cpradr.org/european.htm. In Argentina, Gladys Alvarez
has established the "Programa de Actualizaci6n en Negociaci6n y Resoluci6n de Con-
flictos," http://www.fder.uba.ar/derecho/posgrado/area16.htm.
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legal system, such as cost and delay, along with a general dissatis-
faction with the administration of justice.11 With promises of sav-
ing time and money, ADR (most often the mediation process) was
introduced to, and soon implemented by, the courts. 2 Simultane-
ously, and from a related impetus, 13 mediation as a process for
resolving conflict also flourished at the non-litigation stage of dis-
puting. This process often is termed "community mediation."14
Community mediation centers have grown, and a national organi-
zation for those involved in this work, the National Association for
Community Mediation, was created. 15 More recently, we have
seen the proliferation of mediation use in a variety of contexts,
ranging from the workplace 16 to nursing homes 17 to managed-care
conflicts. 18 With the various applications of mediation, variation in
the way the process is approached and conducted also has surfaced.
11. The Pound Conference, held in 1976 and seen as the beginning of the "modern
mediation movement," was based upon Roscoe Pound's 1906 article, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
See also STEPHEN GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIA.
TION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6-9 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the sources and goals of
the ADR movement).
12. E.g., Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 211 (1995); Jeffrey W. Stem-
pel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at 7venty: Fait
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
297 (1996).
13. Both the court-annexed movement and community use of mediation often are
traced to the Pound Conference in 1976, where alternatives were discussed to respond
to the difficulties in the administration of justice. Edith B. Primm, The Neighborhood
Justice Movement, 81 Ky. L.J. 1067, 1067 (1992-1993).
14. Community mediation centers were often the first ADR programs in a juris-
diction. Id.; see also Timothy Hedeen & Patrick G. Coy, Community Mediation and
the Court System: Ties that Bind, 17 MEDIATION Q. 351 (2000) (assessing the relation-
ship between community mediation and the justice system), available at http://medi-
ate.com/articles/cohed2.cfm.
15. National Association for Community Mediation, http://www.nafcm.org.
16. E.g., L. Camille H6bert, Establishing and Evaluation a Workplace Mediation
Pilot Project: An Ohio Case Study, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 415 (1999); Carrie
Bond, Resolving Sexual Harassment Disputes in the Workplace: The Central Role of
Mediation in an Employment Contract, 52 DisP. RESOL. J. 15 (Spring 1997).
17. E.g., Shoshana K. Kehoe, Giving the Disabled and Terminally Ill a Voice: Man-
dating Mediation for all Physician-Assisted Suicide, Withdrawal of Life Support, or
Life-Sustaining Treatment Requests, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 373 (1999); Di-
ane E. Hoffman, Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 821 (1994);
Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Dis-
putes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 406-15
(1997).
18. James W. Reeves, ADR Relieves Pain of Health Care Disputes, 49 DisP.
RESOL. J. HEALTH CARE L. 421 (1999); EDWARD DAUER ET AL., HEALTH CARE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MANUAL: TECHNIQUES FOR AVOIDING LITIGATION (2000).
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And although the term ADR often is used to describe all of these
processes, it is only upon the mediation process that I focus, be-
cause it is the process that differs so significantly from our more
"traditional" adversarial system. 9 It is the integration of media-
tion with the litigation process that is the focus of this piece.
Mediation and litigation, or the civil justice system, embrace very
different paradigms for dispute resolution and problem solving.
Despite the transparency of the previous statement, judges, legisla-
tures, and lawyers have begun to merge the two,20 often with mixed
results. 21 In some jurisdictions that utilize court-annexed media-
tion, mediation remains a distinct process;22 whereas in others, me-
diation is viewed as merely part of pretrial litigation. 3 There are a
19. For an overview of the significant distinctions, see infra Part II.
20. This is what often is termed "court-annexed mediation," in which the court has
a very active role in the referral and oversight of the mediation. There is some debate,
however, about whether it is an accurate description of the mediation employed in
private practice-or whether "court-annexed" should describe only these programs
that are actually "housed" in the courthouse. Another term is "court connected."
Symposium, The Structure of Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 14 OHIo ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 711 (1999); see also Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation
About the Current Status and the Future of ADR: A View form the Courts, 2000 J.
Disp. RESOL. 11 (2000). In several court programs described and studied by Professor
John McCrory, the mediators were housed in a number of different places including-
but probably not limited to-in-house staff mediators, court contracts with nonprofit
service providers, private mediators paid by the court, private mediators paid by the
parties, volunteer mediators supervised by the court, and mixed programs. John P.
McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil Cases in State Courts: A Litigants Perspective
on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 813, 813-14 (1999).
21. In some jurisdictions, it appears that mediation maintained a separate identity,
although in others, mediation succumbed to the legal process, being changed in terms
of basic goals and objectives. Years ago, the analogy of mixing oil and water was used
to describe the co-existence of ADR and litigation. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Litigation
& ADR: Is It Really Oil & Water?: Art of Advocacy in ADR, S. TEX. C. OF L. & THE
A. A. WHITE Disp. RESOL. INST. (1991). I contended that, as in cooking, oil and water
possess different properties and can be combined in many recipes to produce viable
and tasty results. Thought and consideration must be given to the combinations, how-
ever, lest they become unpalatable.
22. In Nebraska, for instance, the mediators in the federal court program are very
careful to be facilitative in their approach and not engage in what might be termed
case evaluation or "pre-trial settlement." And in Maine, for years divorce and family
mediations were conducted without the presence of lawyers. Cf., Craig McEwen et al.,
Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in
Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995) (arguing for the presence of attor-
neys during divorce mediations).
23. In many jurisdictions in Texas, lawyers are overheard discussing going to medi-
ation as merely normal pretrial activity. On the one hand, it is good that the process
has become so integrated in law practice, but when mediation is viewed only in this
context, a number of attributes, including self-determination and the creative problem
solving potential of the process, are often lost. Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision
of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institu-
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number of reasons for this latter result, one being the strength of
the adversary system itself.
Some of the difficulties in merging mediation and litigation are
also due, in part, to lack of planning and a failure to consider early
on the inherent differences between mediation and litigation.24
This piece does not assume that one system or approach is better
suited for dispute resolution than another, nor will it offer a direct
attack upon the adversary system. 25 Although some are skeptical
about which system is more appropriate for a dispute resolution or
problem solving role,26 I contend that both-and, indeed, many-
different processes for dispute resolution and problem solving will
continue to expand in use. What is most vital to the effective use
of dispute resolution is that each method is approached, and the
participation therein is commensurate, with the goals and objec-
tives of that particular forum.27
This essay will not examine the role of the mediator, though
many questions-including ethical ones-remain about the role of
mediators in general, 28 and, specifically, the role of a lawyer serv-
ing as that neutral.29 In fact, there still is debate over whether the
work of a neutral, be it as arbitrator, mediator, or neutral case
tionalization, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (examining the inherent
conflict between achieving self-determination in which mediation focuses on settle-
ment). Welsh addresses Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (discussing
whether a settlement reached during mediation constitutes an enforceable contract).
24. I view this modern mediation movement as having passed through three dis-
tinct, somewhat overlapping stages. Beginning in the mid-1970s, was a time of experi-
mentation. The 1980s saw a time of implementation, but without any real thought
given to the dilemmas and issues that we now face. The mid-1990s began a time of
regulation, in which a number of regulatory issues were-and still are-confronted by
courts, legislatures, and membership organizations. The role of lawyers in mediation
is but one of the issues for consideration.
25. Although strong support for the mediation process necessitates the move away
from a win-lose perspective, I do not suggest that one system necessarily replace the
other. But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Post-Modern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996) (arguing that
the adversary system is inadequate for the goals of dispute resolution).
26. E.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 63 (1996) (critiquing Carrie Menkel-Meadow's view that alternative
dispute resolution is superior to the adversary system).
27. In the adversary system, it is necessary that disputants retain zealous represen-
tation and compete for slices of a fixed pie; whereas, in more facilitative processes, it
is not necessary to think or operate under the same conditions.
28. E.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Impli-
cations, 1994 J. Disp. RESOL. 1 (1994); John D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 455 (1997); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, ME-
DIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, at Ch. 15 (2d ed. 2000).
29. E.g., Laflin, supra note 4; see also Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restate-
ment, supra note 4.
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evaluator consists of the practice of law and, as such, should or can
be governed by the ethical considerations for lawyers.30 Those dis-
cussions are continuing to take place, 31 and I leave those for an-
other time.32 The focus here is on the role of lawyers in
representing clients, but doing so in a distinct forum-that of the
mediation room as opposed to the courtroom.
In this discourse, I attempt to refrain from reiterating the consid-
erable debate about the various types, styles, and kinds of media-
tion that are utilized, as that has been done, if not overdone.33
Instead, I will concentrate on examining the difficulties resulting
from the insertion of mediation within litigation. Yet it must be
30. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S.
TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997); Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatement supra note 4;
see also Douglas Yarn & Wayne Thorpe, Ethics 2000: Proposed New ABA Ethics
Rules for Lawyers-Neutrals and Attorneys in ADR, Disp. RESOL. MAG. (forthcoming
2001).
31. E.g., Symposium, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, NIDR FORUM, June 1997;
Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate Are Not Practicing Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES
TO THE HIGH COST OF LITiG. 74 (1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the
Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 57 (1996); see also
Geetha Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 15
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 94 (1997).
32. For example, the ABA Section on Alternative Dispute Resolution is working
to resolve some of these issues. Ideally, a resolution from the ABA stating that media-
tion is not the practice of law could pre-empt state bars from charging mediators with
unauthorized practice.
33. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Ris-
kin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998) [hereinafter Mapping Mediation] (ar-
guing that mediation should not be among the processes where the neutral has an
evaluative orientation or role); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orienta-
tions, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7
(1996) (depicting on a grid the mediation universe); James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus
Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919 (1997); Kimberlee K.
Kovach, What Is Real Mediation and Who Should Decide?, 3 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 5
(1996) [hereinafter Real Mediation]; Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997); Robert B. Mo-
berly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S.
TEX. L. REV. 669 (1997) (arguing against ethical rules that prohibit mediator evalua-
tion); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for
Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949
(1997) (endorsing flexible mediation that permits judicious use of evaluative tech-
niques); Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Art of Evaluation, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIc;. 62 (1996) (describing appropriate uses
for mediator evaluation and recommending specific mediator strategies); Kimberlee
K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying Real Dichoto-
mies Underlying the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Mediation in an Eclectic
Regime, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 371 (2000).
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pointed out that some of the confusion 34 and resultant debate
about mediation-as to its goals and objectives as well as theoreti-
cal underpinnings-have been generated by efforts to integrate, or
at least associate, mediation with the adversary system.35
For clarity in this essay, the type and kind of mediation to which
I refer is a process that, by facilitating communication and under-
standing, assists the parties in achieving a solution that they can
accept. 36 In other words, the process is one that is focused on dis-
covering the underlying interests of the parties and on solving a
problem rather than one concentrated on obtaining a settlement
based upon what the law may be or what it declares the parties'
respective rights to be. Although I believe this to be a generally
accepted definition of mediation,37 some disagree and employ
other possible definitions.38
My premise is that mediation has the potential to be a viable
alternative to the adversarial paradigm.39 As long as it continues to
reside within the adversarial system of litigation, however, it will
never have the opportunity to mature into the independent and
unique process that it is designed and promised to be.4 0 The goals
of mediation are quite different than the goals of the litigation sys-
tem. Mediation involves a radically distinct and contrasting para-
digm-one that embraces a mindset, vision, skill set, and attitude
very different from those of the prevailing adversarial norm.41 Re-
flecting on what was first expounded on by Professor Leonard Ris-
kin nearly twenty years ago,42 mediation involves a different
philosophical map, if you will. To participate completely in the
34. E.g., Jeffery W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR
from Ideology, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 247 (2000) (viewing mediation primarily, if not
exclusively, as a supplement to the legal system); cf John Lande, Toward More So-
phisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. Disp. REsOL. 321 (2000).
35. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovaiton Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
36. Interestingly, this is also the definition of mediation. See generally TEx. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023 (Vernon 2000); see also COLo. REV. STAT. ANN
§ 13-22-302 (West 1999).
37. E.g., KOVACH, supra note 28, at 23-25 (outlining a variety of definitions of the
mediation process).
38. Real Mediation, supra note 33.
39. This would include, but may stop short of, the complete adherence to the
transformative model.
40. The goals and objectives of mediation are quite different from those of the
justice system. Infra Part II.
41. Should Mediators Evaluate?: A Debate Between Lela P. Love and James B.
Boskey, 1 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (1999-2000), at http://www.car-
dozo.yu.edu/cojcr.
42. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 29 (1982).
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process, all participants must adopt this philosophical map. More
specifically, to have an effective process, the conduct, performance,
and skill set demonstrated by those who represent clients within a
system must be consistent with the purposes set forth by the sys-
tem. Consequently, the rules, and the conduct to be governed by
those rules, must be changed if lawyers are to be suitable, capable,
and competent representatives in the mediation process. Lawyers
from a variety of practice areas have called for specialty codes of
ethics.43 The rationale for distinct ethics codes for specialized prac-
tice areas is that different goals in representation necessitate differ-
ent roles for the lawyer; hence, the codes that set parameters for
practice should likewise differ." This same premise justifies the
need for different ethical rules for lawyer-representatives in
mediation.
II. DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTERSECTION OF
MEDIATION AND LITIGATION
To say that some difficulties resulted from the integration of me-
diation with litigation is quite an understatement. The intersection
of mediation and litigation can be viewed as having produced a
train wreck-or at least a significant derailment. Mediation was
forced off of the track.45
Much has been written of late on this phenomenon. Some com-
mentators have observed that the focus of the mediator's role may
change in the context of court-annexed work, where the mediation
becomes more "evaluative, 46 or the process more akin to a judi-
cial settlement conference. 7 Others contend that mediators
43. E.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform
Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45 (1998) (discussing the
creation of a federal law of bankruptcy ethics); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and
Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics 76 MICH. L. REV. 423
(1978) (discussing the role of the corporate advisor); Jeffery N. Pennell, Ethics in Es-
tate Planning and Fiduciary Administration: The Inadequacy of the Model Rules and
the Model Code, 45 RECORD 715 (1990).
44. E.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 169 (1997).
45. Again, it is my view that important goals and objectives of mediation, such as
party empowerment, self-determination, and creative problem solving have been for-
feited. See Welsh, supra note 23 (discussing the difficulties of the intersection of medi-
ation and litigation).
46. Riskin, supra note 33; John Brickerman, Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST LITIG. 70 (1996).
47. E.g., Charles R. Pyle, Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conferences: Different
Rides on the Road to Resolution, ARIZ. ATr'Y, Nov. 1996, at 20; Marc Galanter & Mia
Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN.
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should avoid such changes in their practice48 and remain true to the
mediation process. 49 Still others have observed that a hybrid of
procedures has resulted. They use the term "liti-mediation" to de-
scribe a culture in which it is taken for granted that mediation is
the typical way of ending litigation.5" In that culture, mediators are
encouraged to refine skills to fit within the adversarial paradigm.51
Alternatively, mediation also is viewed as wholly outside of the le-
gal context.5
Then there are those who contend that ADR is merely old wine
in new skins.53 To the extent that the only contribution made by
mediation is assistance in the traditional litigation settlement pro-
cedure-with the focus only on risk assessment and predictions of
trial outcome-perhaps it is old wine. If that is the case, then the
use of the mediation label connotes nothing new or innovative, but
is only a re-packaging of an old process. If that is all that we envi-
sion from the mediation process, then very little potential is actual-
ized and therefore lost. Alternatively, if we allow mediation to
achieve its full promise, to provide parties the opportunity to find
creative and satisfactory solutions to problems without the conten-
tiousness of a right-wrong paradigm, then a new model for the res-
olution of conflict will emerge. For it to ripen and flourish, we
must allow a relatively unripe process to mature into a fine instru-
ment of dispute resolution without being overgrown by those mod-
els which are more mature and experienced.
In a number of jurisdictions, mediation has become more akin to
a pretrial procedure, another hoop to jump through before reach-
ing the trial stage of litigation. The use of mediation in litigation
has been the source for the new term "liti-mediation," described by
Professor John Lande in a seminal piece looking at the intersection
L. REV. 1339 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement. Uses and
Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985).
48. Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 33; Zena Zumeta, A Facilita-
tive Mediator Responds, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 335 (2000).
49. Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 33.
50. John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other? 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 846 (1997).
51. See generally DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES (1996) (exam-
ining specific techniques and skills used by mediators in resolving lawsuits).
52. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE
OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOG-
NITION (1994).
53. E.g., Jeffery W. Stempel, Theralaw and the Law-Business Paradigm Debate, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 849, 882 n.124 (1999) (stating that "segments of the ther-
alaw and ADR movements are old wines in new skins...").
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of mediation and litigation. 4 This development demonstrates how
mediation can be, and to some degree has been, consumed by liti-
gation-the very thing advocates of mediation sought to avoid.55
This phenomenon also is illustrated by the use of the term "litiga-
tion lite,"56 which aptly connotes the use of ADR in pending litiga-
tion. Part of the reason mediation has been consumed by litigation
is that many lawyers conceive of it only in the context of litiga-
tion.57 The possibility of individuals in conflict going to mediation,
without first filing a lawsuit, is beyond the consideration of many.
Litigation is viewed also as the default paradigm for conflict res-
olution should settlement not be achieved through the mediation
process. 8 In this version of mediation, the process is used solely to
assist in the settlement of lawsuits, thereby squandering media-
tion's true potential. During this "mediation process," the discus-
sions, actions, and outcomes closely resemble those that occur
during adversarial pretrial litigation. As noted by Judge Wayne
Brazil, this conduct may include activities such as:
Advancing arguments known or suspected to be specious, con-
cealing significant information, obscuring weaknesses, attempt-
ing to divert the attention of other parties away from the main
analytical or evidentiary chance, misleading others about the ex-
istence or persuasive power of evidence not yet formally
presented (e.g., projected testimony from percipient or expert
witnesses), resisting well-made suggestions, intentionally inject-
ing hostility or friction into the process, remaining rigidly at-
tached to positions not sincerely held, delaying other parties'
access to information, or needlessly protracting the proceed-
ings-simply to gain time, or to wear down the other parties or
to increase their cost burdens.59
The invasion of these kinds of behaviors into the mediation pro-
cess also is demonstrated by continuing education courses with ti-
tles like "How to Win in ADR" and "Successful Advocacy
54. Lande, supra note 50, at 846. "Liti-mediation" is an adaptation of the term
"litigotiation" first set forth by Marc Galanter in 1984. Marc Galanter, Worlds of
Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 268, 268
(1984) (placing focus on study of the negotiation process within the context of
litigation).
55. E.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 35, at 6.
56. Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary
Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L. J. 1289 (1998).
57. Stempel, supra note 34.
58. Id.
59. Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation about the Current Status and the
Future of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. Dsp. RESOL. 11, 29 (2000).
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Strategies for Mediations. '' 6° In these instances, perhaps all media-
tion has become a "lite" version of the litigation system. In other
words, it is not a real alternative. Should the trend continue, I fear
that real alternatives no longer will exist. Instead, only two choices
will remain: litigation regular and litigation lite.61
In part, we, the ADR profession, are responsible for this phe-
nomenon. We urged courts and legislatures to require that litigants
participate in mediation, with the promise of saving time and
money for the litigants as well as the court system. Of course, the
use of mediation or ADR can be very effective in saving time and
money. Court dockets can be reduced to a manageable size, as
cases are settled earlier than they would without intervention.62
And perhaps mediation does offer a better view of justice than the
parties otherwise would have, because the parties themselves are
permitted and encouraged to participate in the process. 63
Unfortunately, the fact that mediation is so different from the
traditional paradigm for dispute resolution was never stressed, and
likely in many instances, never even mentioned. In fact, other
commentators now note that both mediation supporters and court
personnel failed to recognize the irony and potential for conflict
when combining "a process that rejects the relevance of the law
into the very institution which conditions access upon an effective
invocation of the law. ' '64 Perhaps it was because the promise of
saving time and expense was sufficient enough to garner interest.65
In other instances, it was perceived that discussions of mediation
and the idea of party participation and empowerment would be
60. Id.
61. Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes,
Rather Than One Eclectic Process, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 295 (2001) (emphasizing that
mediation is but one process in a rich array of different dispute resolution processes
and that, if not kept separate and distinct, this rich array of processes will no longer
exist).
62. E.g., Toni Heinzl, Mediator Coaxes Couples to Agree; Lawyers Say Divorce
Mediation is Fair to Both Sides and Moves Cases Through the Courts More Quickly,
FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Dec. 30, 2000, at 1 (quoting district court judge as
stating, "Mediation gets people out of the system faster").
63. The degree of participation of the actual parties to the litigation differs. Some
lawyers take a dominant participant approach while others participate very little.
JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., MEDIATION AND OTHER NON-BINDING ADR PROCESSES
150-51 (1996). Nevertheless, early research demonstrates that parties are satisfied
with the mediation process because they have the opportunity to participate in resolv-
ing the dispute.
64. Welsh, supra note 45, at n.85.
65. For an overview of a number of court connected mediation programs, see
COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SELECTED STATE AND
FEDERAL PROGRAMS (Edward J. Bergman & John G. Bickerman eds., 1998).
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considered too "touchy-feely" for litigators, those charging into the
battle of the courtroom.66 Most lawyers were not readily willing,
and perhaps not able, to adjust to this very different model of dis-
pute resolution. So to "sell" mediation, the packaging was
changed. Lawyers were encouraged to be tough mediation "advo-
cates" and "win" at mediation. The problem is that the process
was changed or modified along with the packaging-souring a pos-
sibly exquisite vintage.
Another aspect of mediation critical to the realization of its po-
tential is that parties have an opportunity to fashion their own, cre-
ative solutions to their problems. To the chagrin of some in the
justice system, these solutions are quite unlike and even unrelated
to what a court might do in the same situation. Some quarrel with
this, particularly in court-related matters, contending that the par-
ties should at least be advised as to what they might achieve in a
court proceeding, and therefore be in a position to make better
informed decisions about the final outcome or resolution.67 Others
contend that the legal system is the default paradigm to be used,
and therefore during the mediation process consideration should
be given to the most likely litigation results,68 and that the media-
tor has an active role in such deliberations.69
If mediation is indeed a unique process, then it requires new
thinking in order to achieve new solutions. Establishing an innova-
tive process includes establishing new parameters for conduct dur-
ing that process; yet we have given lawyers little guidance in that
regard. Although much time was spent on training and teaching
66. This is based upon nearly ten years of the author's own experience in Texas,
from 1980 to late 1989. When mediation first was discussed with judges and litigators
in Houston in the early 1980s, it was perceived as too "touchy-feely" for real lawyers.
For that very reason, the first ADR process utilized in the Harris County Civil Courts
was the Moderated Settlement. Conference, a neutral case evaluation system.
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Moderated Settlement Conferences, St. Mary's Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, Procedures, Pitfalls and Promises (1988); see also HANDBOOK OF AL-
TERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ch. 7 (Amy L. Greenspan ed., 2d ed. 1990)
(discussing in detail moderated settlement conferences). It was not until 1989, when
some litigators realized that they could participate as mediators and achieve full time
employment in such roles, that mediation came to be accepted. Even today in Texas-
a state that uses mediation and ADR quite extensively-if mediation is focused on
the concept of party empowerment and not on settlement, many litigators see little
value in the process.
67. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice
Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47 (1996).
68. Stempel, supra note 34, at 249.
69. Bickerman, supra note 46.
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mediators,7" little attention was given to what the role of the law-
yer-representative should be in the new process. Apparently, it
was assumed that lawyers would accompany clients into a wholly
different process-with a fraction of understanding about media-
tion and after years of being entrenched in the adversary system-
and conduct themselves in a different manner. In most cases, that
did not occur. Instead of viewing the participants across the medi-
ation table as "joint venturers" in a problem solving process, 71 law-
yers considered them adversaries. Hence, the contentiousness of
the adversary system permeated the mediation process.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
RULES FOR LAWYERS
The ethical rules that currently govern lawyers were written with
the adversary system in mind.72 The underpinnings of the adver-
sary system, with a focus on competition and winning at all costs,
provide the context for the lawyer's work. Merits of the adversary
system, as weighed against a different approach to dispute resolu-
tion or problem solving, have been ably explored,73 yet I mention
this system because it underlies the very nature of lawyer conduct.
The adversarial system has a long history, and although the encour-
agement of adversarial behavior and competition works ideally to
achieve justice through the determination of truth, 7  difficulties
arise as well. In many instances, this adversary ethic has gone too
far.75 Reports have included even threats of murder and fistfights
among lawyers,76 a result of the argumentation, threats, and decep-
tion inherent in the adversarial approach.77 This extreme adver-
sary ethic is likely responsible, at least.partially, for the low regard
70. E.g., Joseph B. Stulberg, Training Interveners for ADR Processes, 81 Ky. L.J.
977 (1992-93).
71. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 163 (1999).
72. Steven C. Krane, Ethics 2000: What Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
323, 325 (1999).
73. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25.
74. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn't Everything. The Lawyer as Prob-
lem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 907-09 (2000).
75. E.g., Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L REV. 1267, 1287-
89 (1975).
76. E.g., Cumuso v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 97-7891, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5427, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2000); Donald P. Baker, Richmond's Civic
Embarrassments; Officials' Troubles and a Fight Over Lee's Portrait Keep City Stewing
in it Past, WASH. POST, June 10, 1999, at B3.
77. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 74, at 907.
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that the general public holds for lawyers as well as the dissatisfac-
tion the profession feels with itself.78
Many contend that the behavior of most lawyers today is a direct
result of the contentiousness and adversarial culture inherent in the
adversary system, both historically and currently.79 Others note
that this culture is not just part of the litigation system, but is a
reflection of society generally.8" Adversary conduct, which may in-
volve ruthlessness, deceit, and verbal warfare, 81 is quite problem-
atic enough in its home environment,82 let alone in the context of a
non-adversarial procedure. The demands of law practices today
seem to compel even more extreme behavior, all of which is em-
ployed in the name of zealous representation.83 Even the profes-
sion itself realizes that constant conduct in a contentious and
litigious manner takes it toll. Lawyers report increased pressure in
a ferociously competitive marketplace and complain about having
to work in an adversarial environment "in which aggression, self-
ishness, hostility, suspiciousness, and cynicism are widespread. '84
Moreover, they complain about a lack of civility among lawyers
and a lack of collegiality and loyalty with partners.85 Yet this con-
duct is reinforced in many instances. Witness the use of metaphors
to describe lawyers' work in a way that promotes combativeness
and dominance.86 Recently, the glamorization of the adversary
lawyer role in the arenas of television and cinema emphasizes such
78. E.g., Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to
Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 547,
553 (1998)..
79. Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Adversarial Zeal with a
Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REV. 7, 18-19 (1987).
80. See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM
DEBATE TO DIALOGUE (1998).
81. Daicoff, supra note 78, at n.73.
82. E.g., Maute, supra note 79, at 9-10; Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and
Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697, 700-01; MARK PERLMUTTER, WHY
LAWYERS AND THE REST OF US LIE AND ENGAGE IN OTHER REPUGNANT BEHAVIOR
(1998); SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYER-
ING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 192 (1994) (noting that many attor-
neys believe that "zealously" representing clients means pushing all rules of ethics
and decency to the limit).
83. Maute, supra note 79, at 9-10.
84. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Un-
happy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 889 (1999) (quot-
ing AMIRAM ELWORK, STRESS MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS 15, 20 (2d ed. 1997)).
85. Id.
86. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and
Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 225, 225-26 (1995).
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adversariness.87 This adversarial attitude begins in law school, it-
self a competitive endeavor.88 The student learns that competitive
methodology is at the core of the legal system, and that translates
to all forms of dispute resolution.89 Perhaps, as others have
pointed out, those individuals who possess a very competitive per-
sonality or lack more collaborative tendencies are drawn to law
school.9" And although some continue to call for change and re-
form of the conduct of lawyers, beginning with legal education as
well as legal ethics, 91 and attempts have been made to effectuate
changes, others wonder whether such reform is actually possible.92
The concept of zealous advocacy, although founded within the
criminal system, has become part of lawyering. 93 This zealotry,
however, has been .exaggerated to the extent that some contend it
gives rise to an unworkable view of the lawyer's task.94 The bellig-
erent and aggressive conduct of some lawyers continued to esca-
late, which resulted in a call for "professionalism" standards.
Today, nearly every bar association has a committee or program
focused on the civility of lawyers with calls for advancing profes-
sionalism and retreating from the "Rambo" approach.95 Although
professional courtesies often are extended, usually this is done only
superficially. Many courtesies are ignored in practice, particularly
under the stresses of time and the need for billable hours.
87. Nancy B. Rapoport, Dressed for Excess: How Hollywood Affects the Profes-
sional Behavior of Lawyers, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 49, 49-51
(2000).
88. E.g., Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age. Recognizing the Importance of Interdis-
ciplinary Education in Law Practice, 74 WASH L. REV. 319, 319, 343 (1999).
89. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 548.
90. Id.
91. E.g., Roger E. Schechter, Changing Law Schools to Make Less Nasty Lawyers,
10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 367 (1997).
92. E.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science or Crumbling Con-
struct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
659, 688-93 (1993); Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Prac-
tice at War with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 945-53 (1993).
93. James R. Elkins, The Moral Labyrinth of Zealous Advocacy, 21 CAP. U. L.
REV. 735, 739 (1992). See also Janeen Kerper & Gary L. Stuart, Rambo Bites the Dust:
Current Trends in Deposition Ethics, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 103, 106-110 (1998) (placing
the origins of zealous advocacy in both the American and British bars into historical
context).
94. E.g., James R. Elkins, Lawyer Ethics: A Pedagogical Mosaic, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 117, 158 n.98 (2000); Kerper & Stuart, supra note 93.
95. E.g., William M. Sage, Physician as Advocates, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1529, 1566
(1999); see also Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adver-
sary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 713 (1983) (stating that revisions to the lawyer's
code of ethics were "designed to substantially reduce the adversarial nature of attor-
ney behavior").
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What is particularly problematic in the adversary system is that
some of the rules permit conduct that may be viewed as deceitful
and contentious. Yet this is approved of in the name of zealous
representation, even though it is not always effective, even within
the adversary paradigm. Many of the very rules that establish pa-
rameters or guidelines for lawyers' behavior were written by law-
yers whoadvocated individual liberties and rights, regardless of
morality issues.96 This mindset was then incorporated into the
mainstream and the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.97
No doubt the adversary system remained the foundation of law-
yers' work in the view of the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission on the
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Ethics 2000
Commission" or "Commission") in its new code98 despite urgings
to the contrary.99 Although modifications were made to accommo-
date the lawyers as neutrals, 100 only one change aimed at the repre-
sentative lawyer was enacted, that being a suggestion-but not a
mandate-to inform clients about ADR. 10 1
In the negotiation process, for example, Rule 4.1 provides a very
nebulous truthfulness standard.10 2 And although more than twenty
years ago there appeared, at least in early drafts, a provision calling
for more honesty in negotiation,'0 3 it was deleted and the current
provision inserted.10 4 The wording of the Comments often is used
to support various methods of puffery and trickery in the context
of negotiation. Although I do not support these "conventions in
negotiation" as it allows representatives and those who negotiate
96. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 563-64.
97. Id. at 564; Krane, supra note 72, at 325.
98. Yarn & Thorpe, supra note 30. For the entire report of the work on the pro-
posed code, Ethics 2000, see http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html.
99. E.g., Robert F. Cochran Jr., ADR,. the ABA, and Client Control. A Proposal
that the Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX.
L. REV. 183 (1999).
100. Yarn & Thorpe, supra.note 30.
101. Cochran, supra note 99; see also Richard W. Painer et al., Speakers Propose
Model Rules Amendments to Ethics 2000 Commission, 9 THE PROFESSIONAL LAW-
YER, at 10 (1998). Even this measure was not as some had suggested. I, as chair of the
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, urged that lawyers inform clients about ADR, as
well as provide an explanation of the ethical boundaries for lawyer conduct in media-
tion, particularly that the conduct should differ from that in the adversarial arena.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1999).
103. James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Nego-
tiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., at 926 (1980).
104. Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing
with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 190-91 (1981).
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to deceive other parties, it remains at this point the norm, and is
still accepted in legal contexts. °5 This clearly should not be the
standard in mediation, a process that is dependent upon the direct
and truthful exchange of communication.
But this conduct now carries over into the mediation context. If
mediation is viewed as nothing more than facilitated negotiation,
then what is acceptable conduct in the context of direct negotiation
becomes, by extension, acceptable in the facilitated negotiation.
This conclusion is contrary to those qualities, attitudes, and con-
duct basic to the mediation paradigm. Such approaches erode the
fertile ground upon which to base non-adversarial resolutions. If it
were up to me, and likely others,1"6 I would change the "conven-
tions" in the first place. Understanding that much direct negotia-
tion still takes place in the context of the adversary system,
however, perhaps it should remain as is, but at least be qualified in
the contexts of mediation and other problem-solving, non-adver-
sarial processes, such as consensus building and collaboration.1
0 7
Mediation is a process requiring, even demanding, a distinct
mindset-unlike that necessary when entering the battlefield of lit-
igation. But when the mediation process was combined with the
highly adversarial litigation approach, mediation was all but con-
sumed. When we examine the goals and objectives of each system,
we see that they are very different. Although the adversary system
attempts to determine truth, preserve rights, determine right and
wrong, and punish a wrongdoer, the mediation process, on the
other hand, focuses on the determination of interests, creative
problem solving, party empowerment, and process satisfaction.
10 8
Yet this innovative and unique varietal of wine was placed into
the old wineskins of competitiveness and adversariness. In so do-
ing, the potential for mediation to ripen and mature into its own
varietal, quite different from that of the adversary model, was lost.
As a result, many approaches to mediation are viewed as only liti-
105. E.g., Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics: How to Deceive without Being Dis-
honest; How to be Assertive Without Being Offensive, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 713 (1997);
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA L. REV. 1219
(1990); Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1987).
106. See James Alfini, E2K Leaves Mediation in an Ethics Black Hole, 7 Disp.
RESOL. MAG. (forthcoming 2001).
107. For a discussion of collaborative lawyering, see infra notes 254-260 and accom-
panying text.
108. Symposium, Teaching a New Paradigm: Must Knights Shed Their Swords and
Armor to Enter Certain ADR Arenas?, 1 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL.
(1999), at http://cardozo.yu.edu/cojcr/new-site/issues/voll/vollhtm.
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gation lite;"°9 and the lawyers who represent clients in that system
merely as wolves in sheep's clothing.1 0
I contend that we need new wineskins if the wine is to mature to
its greatest potential, because wineskins are the parameters that
shape the lawyers' conduct. It is possible to modify the lawyer's
skill set, so that wolves are taught to act as sheep. Although others
contend that both wolf- and sheep-like conduct are called for in
many instances,"' I urge that in most mediation circumstances, a
more collaborative and cooperative, sheep-like approach is appro-
priate. If more specific ethics can be designated for those in collab-
orative situations, then the old wine in the old wineskins will
remain intact. So, too, with the parameters of law practice, which
now include those more traditional as well as innovative ap-
proaches to problem-solving and conflict resolution. Then, as the
parable states, both systems may be preserved.
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR NEw RULES
Presuming these differences between the two systems, specifi-
cally the fact that lawyer conduct and skills should be different in
mediation, the question then arises: are new or different rules
needed to effectuate such distinct conduct? A number of practic-
ing lawyers contend that lawyers can and should merely learn dif-
ferent strategies and tactics to use in the mediation process. 112
That, however, is problematic. Many practicing lawyers may not
be inclined to learn new and innovative approaches to lawyering,
unless, of course, there is sufficient motivation in terms of necessity
or enhanced practice revenues. Many categories of change are re-
sisted by the bar, sometimes quite strongly." 3
New rules are necessary. Rules guide lawyers' behavior. In fact,
the enactment and enforcement of rules are the most likely mecha-
109. Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary
Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1292
(1998).
110. For further discussion of this phenomenon, see Robinson, supra note 5.
111. Symposium, supra note 108.
112. This statement is based upon the responses of several audiences before whom
I have made this pitch about a requirement of certain standards of conduct (such as
good faith) for participation in the mediation process.
113. Note the vigor with which new approaches to lawyering have been opposed,
particularly with regard to the amendments of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. For further information on this topic, see John Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni,
Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to
Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L.
REv. 83 (2000).
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nism to change lawyer conduct. Because of their emphasis on
rights and objectivity, lawyers are more willing to change behavior
to conform to codified rules than to respond to a more intangible,
subjective call for conduct.1 14 Moreover, lawyers are familiar and
comfortable with rules. For example, continuing legal education
("CLE") programs were offered in the past, but it was not until the
states required a specific number of CLE hours per year to main-
tain licensure that attendance escalated.' 15
That is why, at least to some extent, this change to non-adver-
sarial practices in the mediation process must be effectuated by
changes in the codes of professional responsibility. Although it is
too late for real changes in the recent Ethics 2000 project,'16 it is
not too late to begin looking at the possibilities of establishing a
separate, or at least supplemental, code for lawyers who represent
clients in non-adversarial fora for dispute resolution. This might be
effectuated by amending the existing codes or, alternatively, and
perhaps more appropriately, by enacting a separate code, opera-
tional when practicing in a different forum, such as mediation. This
recommendation is not something new, as specialized ethical con-
siderations and codes have been urged in a variety of different
practice areas. 117 Moreover, the "test" for whether different rules
should be applied because of the difference in practices" 8 clearly is
met in terms of the mediation process.
Most of us are familiar with having some directive to guide our
behavior. From one perspective, morality often is viewed as rule-
based." 9 Looking to religion as a basis, most denominations re-
ceive guidance from rules and tradition. The education system is
similarly full of standards, and therefore, so, too, are lawyers and
114. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 573-74.
115. Rocio T. Aliaga, Framing the Debate on Mandatory Continuing Legal Educa-
tion (MCLE) The District of Columbia Bar's Consideration of MCLE, 8 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 1145 (1995); Lisa A. Grigg, The Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Debate: Is it Improving Lawyer Competency or is it Just Busy Work?, 12 B.Y.U. J.
PUB. L. 417 (1998).
116. For a complete overview of the work of "Ethics 2000," as well as the final
product which is to be taken before the ABA's House of Delegates, see http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html. See also infra notes 134-146 and accompanying text.
117. E.g., Rapoport, supra note 43, at 45; see also, Stanley Sporkin, Commentary,
The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7
GEO.. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149, 150-52 (1993) (urging specialized ethics for corporate and
securities practice).
118. Rapoport, supra note 43, at 65-69 (setting forth a test of sorts to determine
whether different codes of ethics are appropriate or necessary).
119. Nancy B. Rapoport, Living "Top-Down" in a "Bottom-up" World: Musings on
the Relationship Between Jewish Ethics and Legal Ethics, 78 NEB. L. REV. 18 (1999).
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law students. New law students become almost "programmed," if
you will, to want to know the rules, the black letter. If there are no
rules pertaining to mediation, and no requirements that students
learn different skill sets or attitudes for it, then it is likely that the
majority will not do so. In many instances, legal education is inter-
ested in preservation of the status quo, what has already been
learned and reinforced. This creates a resistance to innovation. As
a result, the legal culture has a real interest in preserving the adver-
sary system;120 therefore, external motivation is necessary.
Ethical guidelines sometimes motivate, but most often limit, law-
yers' conduct. I do acknowledge, however, that not all change will
or can be accomplished by ethics alone. These rules must be com-
plemented by additional efforts. Some of us, for example, are at-
tempting to effectuate change through educational endeavors.
Students in law school can be educated, but a number of other
factors influence just how effective that education will be. First,
students are directed by rules; they want to know what the rules
are, and how to comply with them. By the second year of law
school, students are familiar with having rules to guide their con-
duct and provide answers to most problems. If there are no rules
that dictate conduct in a specific context, they sometimes conclude
that context is not an important matter. Second, although this
practice may not yield greater success, the persuasive method of
teaching in the law schools is that of competitiveness and adver-
sariness. 12 1 Therefore, there exists in law schools little institutional
culture to reinforce new, non-adversarial approaches to practice
and, in fact, what is reinforced is just the opposite. Third, law stu-
dent personality types are such that most students lean toward the
competitive approach. 122 Finally, even in those instances in which
there has been sufficient education so that the students understand
and acknowledge that different standards and skill sets should be
utilized in non-adversarial situations, adhering to those standards
and applying those skills may not be rewarded in the real world of
everyday practice.
A number of factors account for this. For example, promotions
and monetary rewards are dependent to a large degree upon billa-
120. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 113, at 89.
121. Susan Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem Solvers: Connecting Conversations
about Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
119, 122 (1997) (critiquing the "gladiator model" and advocating a shift to more of a
problem-solving paradigm).
122. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 586.
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ble hours. If cases are resolved and settled, there is, necessarily,
less legal work to do on that file. Many ADR proponents, when
confronted with this obstacle to wholehearted ADR implementa-
tion, have emphasized that satisfied clients would return should
they have additional legal problems. Furthermore, satisfied clients
actively will refer others to those lawyers with whom they are
pleased. Nonetheless, neither the decrease of revenues nor the in-
crease in client referral has been adequately and empirically
researched; therefore, some of these concerns remain.
The practice of law is still largely competitive, from obtaining
and maintaining clients, 23 to the adversary process itself. Students
learn this fact early in law school.'2 4 When a lawyer "wins" a trial,
there is great celebration around the firm. Such celebrating is not
necessarily the case when the lawyer merely has settled the matter,
though in many instances the settlement may in fact be an outcome
superior to the trial for both the client and the firm. The United
States Department of Justice has established a process by which
new United States Attorneys are evaluated on their ability to prob-
lem solve, as well as try cases.125 It is this type of approach that
values less traditional problem solving approaches to lawyering
that is sorely needed and necessary in the world of practice. 126
The contentiousness and adversariness of law practice also has
been somewhat responsible for the increasing need for profession-
alism mandates. But even here there is some disagreement about
the need for and manner of effecting change. 27 Thus, how to ef-
fecutate change becomes a real issue.'28 This debate boils down to
whether one should work within the system or create a new set of
rules.
The proposal of new or different ethics requirements in a partic-
ular specialized practice area is not a novel concept. 1.29 Matrimo-
123. Schiltz, supra note 84, at 888-89; see also Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem
Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, in 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1999) (encouraging
law students to be problem solvers).
124. Because ADR courses attempt to teach a more cooperative and collaborative
approach to dispute resolution, I think that as the instructor I should "walk the talk,"
and encourage students to collaborate on assignments, such as journals based upon
the exercises conducted in class. Interestingly, in a class of approximately sixty stu-
dents, only two agreed to write their paper together.
125. Janet Reno, Symposium, Creative Problem Solving Conference, Session I: En-
visioning the New Lawyer, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2000).
126. Id.
127. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 566.
128. Id. at 594.
129. E.g., Zacharias, supra note 44; Sporkin, supra note 117.
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nial lawyers, for example, adhere to additional ethics based in part
on the extra consideration that must be given to non-client third
parties. 130 Different rules in terms of ethics also have been urged
in the areas of bankruptcy law,' maritime law, tax law, military
law, family law, and environmental law.132 Implicit in these discus-
sions is an acknowledgement that a single unitary code for all areas
of practice is unsuccessful. 3 I propose that if these practice areas,
many of which operate in an adversarial paradigm, need indepen-
dent rules, so, too, must representational work in mediation.
A test of sorts134 has been set forth by Dean Nancy Rapoport for
determining if, in fact, new or distinct ethical considerations or
rules are warranted in a specific area of legal practice. 35 The pre-
liminary question is whether there is a poor "fit" of practice with
the generalist model of ethics.136 In the mediation context, where
the substantive law is similar to other practice areas, both civil and
criminal, the manner in which the procedure or process works is so
dissimilar from that of adversary representation that I would con-
tend that there is no "fit." When evaluating mediation, one recog-
nizes that the skill sets, focus, thought processes, and analysis differ
so significantly that there may be little to resemble the activity in
an adversarial trial. 37
The baseline question having been answered in the affirmative-
there is a poor fit with the conventional model-Rapoport would
then have us move to what she terms the "second order"'138 ques-
tions. Four additional observations help generate a justification for
a specialized code of ethics. These observations are: (1) the exis-
tence of repeat players with novice practitioners; (2) jurisdictional
layers; (3) ease of code enactment; and (4) the benefits of a single
code balanced against the disadvantages of abandoning state
regulation. 39
130. Rapoport, supra note 43, at 61-63
131. Id. at 49.
132. Id. at 56-57; see also Zacharias, supra note 44, at 190-98 (discussing specialized
codes of conduct for various legal specialties, but stressing the need for code drafters
to prescribe methods for facilitating communication between lawyers and clients).
133. Id. at 56; see also Krane, supra note 72, at 330.
134. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 65-69.
135. I reiterate that my focus is on the lawyer who represents clients in the practice
area of mediation, rather than on the neutral mediator.
136. Rapoport, supra note 43, at 65.
137. Supra Part II (outlining and emphasizing the differences between the adver-
sary system and the mediation process).
138. Rapoport, supra note 43, at 70.
139. Id. at 70-77.
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The first of these considerations encompasses the necessity of a
code describing acceptable behavior for those within a given prac-
tice community. 4 ' In her example, bankruptcy, as new and inex-
perienced lawyers enter the practice arena, Rapoport contends that
a code is needed in order to prescribe ethical or acceptable con-
duct. This test is met as well in the context of the mediation pro-
cess. Many lawyers do not have the experience of representing
clients in mediation. Not all law students-not even a majority-
take ADR courses. Even for those exposed to ADR in law school,
once in practice, new lawyers may be so consumed with learning all
of the nuances of practice that distinctions between adversarial and
non-adversarial processes become blurred. One way to maintain
the contrast is to enact a code of conduct for mediation.
In consideration of the second issue, which touches upon multi-
jurisdictional practice issues, Rapoport acknowledges the states' in-
terest in enforcing lawyer ethics. As the licensing entity, each state
is responsible for oversight of attorneys.' With the ongoing in-
crease in multi-state practice, however, it may be more sensible to
enact a national code. 142 In bankruptcy matters, so long as a law-
yer is admitted to practice in one state, he is able to practice in any
bankruptcy court through the use of a motion pro hac vice. 143 This
model could be applied to mediation, where an even more compel-
ling case can be made as no one must be licensed-as yet-in order
to represent parties in mediation. 44 Mediation takes place across
state lines, particularly in large, multiparty cases in which lawyers
come from numerous jurisdictions. Often due to convenience,
these cases are mediated in jurisdictions different from that in
which the case is pending. One central, universal code of conduct
that would govern all of the lawyers representing clients would be
140. Id. at 70.
141. Id. at 72-73, 76.
142. E.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 113, at 92 (describing the role state
bar associations play in attorney regulation); Krane, supra note 72, at 330 (stating that
the "entire structure of attorney regulation in the United States is Balkanized").
143. Rapoport, supra note 43, at 79 n.164.
144. This consideration has obvious and considerable implications for mediation.
Non-lawyers may be able to represent parties at mediation-for example, financial
planners and accountants in business matters, or therapists in family cases. GALTON,
supra note 5, at 8; see also KOVACH, MEDIATION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra
note 31, at 101 n.23 (discussing various roles for the mediation representative). But
see Birbrower, Mantalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1998) (holding that representation of a client in the preparation for arbitration and
ultimate settlement of a case pending in California, where the lawyers were not li-
censed, was the unauthorized practice of law).
958
NEW WINE / NEW WINESKINS
not only efficient but more evenhanded for all participants. 14 5
And, of course, with the rise in pre-suit mediation, there are no
courts to which jurisdiction could be attached. This factor certainly
demonstrates the need for different rules in terms of mediation
practice, rules that would apply regardless of the location of the
actual mediation session.
Continuing with the test as put forth by Rapoport, I consider the
last two issues together, as both appear to provide for a balancing
of sorts. One concerns the ease with which such a new code could
be enacted and implemented. The other is whether benefits result-
ing from such efforts would outweigh the difficulties in enacting
and enforcing new provisions for lawyer conduct.146 I have sug-
gested elsewhere that both the establishment and enforcement of
different guidelines for participation in mediation would not be a
simple task.' 47 A variety of hurdles and obstacles will need to be
surmounted, but in the long run, the benefits of enacting and en-
forcing, for awhile, 48 new provisions for lawyers' conduct in medi-
ation will outweigh the struggles encountered. Balancing may be
difficult, but if something is not implemented, I fear that difficulties
in mediation will continue. Mediation as a distinct process will be
eroded until ultimately all that remains of the process is nothing
more than pretrial settlement discussions.
V. THE ETHICS OF NON-ADVERSARIAL REPRESENTATION
Having established the necessity of new and distinct ethical rules
for lawyers who represent clients in mediation, and perhaps other
problem solving arenas,149 the next consideration is the rules them-
selves. What should those rules be? How should ethics inform the
145. Although it is likely that the court in which the case is pending might be able
to set forth guidelines for mediation, as some do, this involvement would be only on a
case-by-case basis. What I urge here is something broader that would not only guide
behavior in each case, but also begin to revise ethical conduct of lawyers generally.
146. Rapoport, supra note 43, at 74.
147. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation: Requested, Recommended or
Required: A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575 (1997).
148. After a period of time, enforcement may not be necessary as such conduct
becomes relearned, reinforced, and integrated generally into lawyering.
149. It may be valuable also to look at the long-term effect of such new rules in
mediation, in which extending these guidelines would be applicable in other non-ad-
versarial processes. One example might be a problem solving negotiation effort. E.g.,
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984). See also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET
AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES
(2000) (offering a proactive approach to negotiation that also serves to reduce ten-
sions associated with dispute resolution).
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lawyer's conduct at mediation? I do not contend that we necessa-
rily can transform people or their basic tendencies.15 ° In fact, I
question whether that same individual who is an outstanding zeal-
ous adversary is capable of altering conduct for a non-adversarial
representational role. 5' But behavior can be changed by the en-
actment and enforcement of specific, directive rules. 5 ' Although
ethical rules generally are designed to be multipurpose in nature,153
I urge specificity and detail in creating standards of conduct for
lawyer representatives in non-adversarial processes. Codes of legal
ethics generally have been designed to achieve two objectives.
One, punishment of departures from the "floor" of acceptable,
minimally ethical conduct; and the other, guidance toward im-
provements above that floor.154 Certainly new ethical considera-
tions for lawyers who represent clients in mediation must
encompass both of these goals; but, I also suggest a third, educa-
tional, objective. In part, it is the lack of education and training in
non-adversarial and problem solving lawyering that is responsible
for inadequate representation at mediation. To achieve these three
goals, ethical standards or a code must be specific in direction,
while simultaneously allowing for some discretion and choices in
style and approach.
One option is the creation of an entire separate Code of Ethical
Considerations for those who represent clients in mediation. A
less radical option is to add a new rule, which would override the
current rules governing lawyers who represent clients in mediation.
For example, Rule 3.8 for prosecuting attorneys provides such an
approach. 155 One for attorneys as mediation representatives simi-
larly could be drafted. Of course, another alternative would be
merely to include appropriate commentary to the existing rules-
for example, Rule 2.1 with regard to discussions with the client,
Rule 4.1 regarding truthfulness in communication with, or Rule 3.1
regarding candor.156
150. There needs to be some consideration as to basic personality type as it relates
to lawyering and negotiation. Both are relevant here, but would of course require
much more study and deliberation than has been done at this time. Daicoff, supra
note 78.
151. Infra Part IV.
152. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 573-74.
153. Rapoport, supra note 43 at 52.
154. Id. at 53-54, 70.
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8 (1999).
156. Id. R. 3.1.
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The following discussion represents mere suggestions, a starting
point if you will, for a dialogue about the ethical parameters of
non-adversarial legal representation. Just as debate contributed to
the creation of the first ethical provisions for lawyers, so we should
begin discussions anew. It may take some time before an actual
code or set of guidelines is put in place, these matters are now ripe
for discussion. Although concern has been expressed about "over-
regulation" in ADR, the dispute resolution field currently is focus-
ing on the development of rules and standards for practice. Media-
tor organizations as well as legislatures and courts have begun to
enact regulations, and it seems appropriate that the role of the law-
yer-representative also be considered. The legal system, more gen-
erally, also continues to evolve with matters such as
multijurisdictional practice,157 multidisciplinary practice, 158 and
transactional practice. Non-adversarial representation also should
be included in rethinking the lawyer role. And as legal educators,
it is imperative that we not only keep up with changes, but also
take a leadership role in these developments.
A. The Good Faith Standard
In some instances, a standard of good faith participation in medi-
ation has been advocated.15 9 A detailed discussion, including both
the advantages and downsides to such an approach may be found
elsewhere,1 60 but a brief discussion is warranted here. Although a
good faith standard is proposed here as an ethical issue for lawyers,
courts already consider participants' conduct at mediation in the
context of good faith mandates. 161 In either approach, what may
157. Harriet E. Miers, American Bar Association Study of Multistate Practice is on
Fast Track, ARIZ. A-rr'y, Feb. 2001, at 29.
158. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 113; Carol A. Needham, Permitting Law-
yers to Participate in Multi-Discipline Practice: Business as Usual, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1315 (2000).
159. Kovach, supra note 147.
160. Id.; see also Brazil, supra note 20, at 32-34 (stating that "good faith" require-
ments "may well have the ironic effect of intensifying the temptations to 'litigize'
mediation").
161. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d. 657 (Tex. App. Ct. 1998) (affirming
a trial court's award of sanctions for lack of good faith participation in mediation).
But see Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d. 370 (Tex. App. Ct. 1999)
(holding that because defendant filed an objection to the court's order for mediation,
it was relieved of good faith obligation). See also Foxgate Homeowner's Ass'n v.
Bramalea Cal., Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that sanctions
may be appropriate for a lawyer who failed to fully and adequately participate in
mediation), review granted, 999 P.2d 666 (2000).
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be helpful to the endeavor is at least to begin a consideration of
what such a standard or obligation might look like.
Good faith in mediation does not mean that an agreement must
be achieved. 162 In order to demonstrate good faith, the parties
need not settle the controversy. Mandatory good faith also does
not dictate that agreements will be more likely. In fact, I am quite
sure that there are many instances in which neither party to the
mediation demonstrated good faith in the process and yet the par-
ties still were able to reach an accord. As has been pointed out,
settlement is not, and should not be, the absolute or only objective
of mediation. 16 3 The process can be fruitful and beneficial even if
no agreement is reached.164
Good faith would not obligate the parties to possess a sincere
desire to resolve the matter, nor should it necessitate complete dis-
closure to the other participants or even the mediator. But infor-
mation exchange is a vital part of mediation, so it is likely that an
element of good faith would call for some sharing of informa-
tion.165 The scope of information to be disclosed, however, would
remain within the discretion of the participants. Honesty in terms
of this information also should be a basic consideration in defining
elements of a good faith mandate. Just "being nice" also is not an
element of good faith. One can be kind and cooperative, and yet
do nothing to advance the ball in terms of resolution. Sometimes,
of course, being "nice" is used as a tactic to throw the other unsus-
pecting party off guard, as in "good cop-bad cop" tactics.166 Mov-
ing or changing an offer or demand also is not an essential element
of good faith.167 In fact, consideration of good faith should not be
based upon the content of the proposals.
The term good faith can be, and likely is, used to mean a number
of different things, and this potential lack of clarity is viewed as
162. Kovach, supra note 147, at 584.
163. Welsh, supra note 23.
164. For example, other aspects of a relationship, such as communication, may be
enhanced, which may result in the decrease in future conflict. Moreover, one recog-
nized approach to mediation de-emphasizes reaching an agreement while placing fo-
cus on other critical aspects of the process, such as recognition and empowerment.
BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 52. Partial agreements are also possible, as is reaching an
accord sometime after the mediation. KOVACH, MEDIATION PRINCIPLES AND PRAC-
TICE, supra note 28, at Ch. 13.
165. Kovach, supra note 147, at 611.
166. For a discussion of a number of negotiation tactics, see CHARLES B. CRAVER,
EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 167-204 (2d ed. 1993).
167. Halaby, McCrea, & Cross v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 902, 908 (Colo. 1992) (en
banc).
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problematic in terms of establishing this standard. Prior criticism
of good faith is, in part, based on the lack of objective standards,
along with a corollary consideration, that a demonstration of good
or bad faith is dependent on one's state of mind.168 A specific defi-
nition, at least initially, will be necessary in order to provide de-
tailed and useful guidance, leading to objective standards for
mediation conduct. Such specificity can be beneficial in a number
of ways. For example, mediation participants must know what is
expected of them. Details in rules may aid the mediator, if and
when a determination is to be made, and may assist the court
should enforcement be necessary. In looking at definitions of good
faith in other contexts, the requirements have been applied prima-
rily to actions that occur during the exchange segment of the nego-
tiation. Yet the mediation process really begins earlier.
Preparation and presence at the mediation are necessary and im-
portant stages of the process. Courts currently do order attend-
ance at mediation and advance exchange of information. 169 These
are important considerations when creating a rule that is directly
specific to mediation and is enforceable.
In addition to preparation and presence, the following list pro-
vides suggested aspects of conduct that could constitute the ele-
ments of a good faith standard: arriving at the mediation prepared
with knowledge of the matter, in terms of both factual background
and possible solutions; having all necessary decision-makers pre-
sent at the mediation, not via telephone; taking into account the
interests of the other parties; demonstrating a willingness to listen
and attempting to understand the position and interests of the
other parties; being prepared not only to discuss the issues and in-
terests of your client, but also to listen to the issues and interests of
all other participants; engaging in open and frank discussions about
the case or matter in a way that might illuminate one's position for
the other to know and understand better; not lying when asked a
specific and direct question; not intentionally misleading the other
side; having a willingness to discuss your position in detail; and ex-
plaining the rationale underlying why a specific proposal is all that
will be offered, or why one is refused.
168. Kovach, supra note 147, at 599.
169. E.g., Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea, California, Inc., 78 Cal. App.
4th, 653 (Cal. App. Ct. 2000) (sanctioning lawyer for failing to act in good faith). In
Texas, standard court orders to mediation often contain language regarding negotia-
tion in good faith.
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Good faith also would include coming to the mediation with a
willingness to be open to another perspective. Parties need not
agree with one another, but only attempt to understand the differ-
ing viewpoints and, at the very least, not summarily and without
consideration reject what the other party has to say. And from the
lawyer's perspective, an additional guideline may be appropriate,
such as allowing the client to discuss the matter directly with the
other side and with the mediator.17 ° The focus again is on the free
flow of information between the disputing parties, a hallmark of
the communication and participation necessary in the mediation
process. As a requirement, it is important that the necessity of
good faith be communicated to the participants prior to mediation.
Consequently, conduct comprising good faith should be included as
an integral part of the description and definition of the mediation
process itself. Although a good faith requirement in mediation
also could be established by legislation, court rule, or rules of prac-
tice in mediation, 171 the focus here is on incorporating such a stan-
dard into the rules of conduct or ethical considerations for lawyers.
B. The Minimal Meaningful Participation Standard
Others urge that the load should be lightened somewhat, and call
for a standard of minimal meaningful participation in mediation. 72
This would include a level of preparation and participation that is
somewhat less onerous than that advocated by a good faith stan-
dard, but nonetheless could be quite effective in focusing lawyer
representatives on the importance of adequate levels of participa-
tion in mediation. This preparation is critical because mediation
relies significantly upon communication.
Communication is essential to the mediation process, so that
parties are able to achieve greater understanding of each other's
perspectives and positions in their effort to reach mutually satisfac-
tory resolutions. Dean Sherman acknowledges that this prerequi-
site certainly is aided by the candid and sincere participation of
parties and lawyers, and that the truthful disclosure of relevant in-
formation should be encouraged in the interests of promoting a
170. Sternlight, supra note 5 (going into excellent detail about how to allocate the
various actions and roles between lawyers and clients depending upon the barriers to
resolution).
171. Kovach, supra note 147, at 597.
172. Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Form of Participation Should be Required? 46 SMU L. REV. 46 at 2079, 2096 (1993).
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mutually acceptable settlement. 173 Although Sherman acknowl-
edges that mediation works best if parties "demonstrate a willing-
ness to listen and attempt to understand the position and interests
of others and communicate positions in detail, as well as explain
the rationale" for any proposal, he urges that such a level of com-
munication not be mandated and enforced by sanctions in rules
and court orders. 74 His opposition to a mandatory approach
seems to stem from the view of mediation as a voluntary, consen-
sual process in which the parties are empowered to seek their own
solutions with the aid of a mediator facilitator.1 75 He also notes
that many of the court rules mandating mediation are justified as
only requiring participation in a non-binding process that does not
undermine parties' right not to settle. 176
Sherman suggests an alternative participation requirement that
is the "minimal meaningful participation" standard. Sherman con-
tends that because mediation is a relatively unstructured ADR pro-
cess, little by way of formal participation is needed. 17 7 The
standard is justified, however, since some level of process involve-
ment is necessary to ensure that the process is not futile,178 and that
it would assist in achieving a central objective of mediation-en-
couraging the parties to communicate in the interests of settle-
ment.179 The minimal meaningful participation standard does not
direct a comprehensive presentation of the case but, rather, re-
quires little more than the parties briefly discussing their positions
as to the relevant issues, listening to the other side, and reacting to
the other side's positions.8 0 Sherman notes that the failure to ad-
dress or to disclose information as to all issues may suggest weak-
ness or lack of candor to the other party and thereby lower its
willingness to make offers, but that is a strategic risk a party should
be entitled to take.1 8 ' Apparently, this is an attempt to balance
what is essential in mediation with the litigants' right to control
litigation. 82
173. Edward F. Sherman, Good Faith Participation in Mediation: Aspirational, Not





178. See Sherman, supra note 172, at 2096-2103.
179. Id. at 2096.
180. Id. at 2096-97.
181. Sherman, supra note 173.
182. Sherman, supra note 172, at 2101-03.
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Conceding that an objective of mediation is to identify the un-
derlying interests of the parties in hope of finding a solution that
satisfies both sides, Sherman maintains, nonetheless, that disguis-
ing true interests and bottom lines realistically cannot be prohib-
ited.183 He fears that courts would become entangled in judging
subjective negotiation behavior, and that severely could abridge lit-
igant autonomy.184 Thus, Dean Sherman acknowledges a concern
with devising standards of participation conduct that are consistent
with the goals and objectives of mediation, but contends that, simi-
lar to the "professionalism" codes, such standards should be aspira-
tional rather than mandatory and enforceable by sanctions. To the
extent that such an aspirational benchmark would assist in educa-
tional efforts, it is certainly worth additional deliberation and
reflection.
C. The Ethic of Care Standard
In other contexts, commentators have called for an ethic of care
in lawyering.'85 An ethic of care standard has been discussed more
generally, particularly in light of how it would alter the parameters
of lawyers' general ethical responsibilities. 86 The care ethic or mo-
rality consists of a rather broad perspective on individuals' con-
duct. For example, an "ethic of care has been defined as a practice
of extending care and compassion to vulnerable individuals and
groups who have been harmed or are in harm's way. '87 An ethic
of care standard has been used to consider "critical questions about
the law and its impact on vulnerable groups and individuals, 188
and it also is viewed as a foundation of moral and philosophical
thought. 89
An "ethic of care" standard was proposed by Carol Gilligan as a
contrast to an "ethic of justice or rights."'190 She contended that a
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism,
and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S L.J. 39 (1985).
186. Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J.
2665 (1993).
187. Francis Carleton & Jennifer Nutt Carleton, An Ethic of Care and the Hazard-
ous Workplace, 10 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 283 (1995).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 283.
190. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 8, 33 (1982).
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rights orientation is only one form of moral reasoning and that
there is another, termed an "ethic of care." This care ethic looks
not at rights and duties, but rather on the connections between
people. 191 Such an approach involves a "relational ethic" that
makes "creating and sustaining responsive connection to others" a
priority.192
An ethic of care also may entail a responsibility to take concrete
steps to minimize harm to the parties. The ethic of care that Gilli-
gan discussed often is considered to be a distinctive feminist ethic,
or voice, of women, 93 although this point is now much debated. 194
Others contend that such a care ethic should be a part in the moral
understanding of every person, which also includes every lawyer. 95
Adoption of an ethic of care has been urged as a means to change
the world of legal practice. 196 Yet the current codes of legal ethics
provide little awareness of the possibility of considerations of
care.
197
Although some of the discussion of an ethic of care relates to the
lawyers' viewpoints, more generally, such an ethic also has been
urged in terms of the relationship between lawyers and clients. 198
Elements of the skill set included in an ethic of care include empa-
thy and listening. 99 This is most appropriate and fitting for media-
tion. The mediation process is one that is based in large part on
communication, and listening is a critical element of the communi-
cation process. Just as the care ethic is contrasted with the rights
and justice orientation, so, too, the adversarial system may be con-
trasted with the mediation paradigm. Whereas the foundation of
the adversary system is the protection and establishment of rights,
in mediation, resolutions can be achieved without a decision-or
often without even a discussion-of rights or justice. It seems most
apt, then, that such a care ethic be a starting point for standards of
191. Paul J. Zwier & Ann B. Hamric, The Ethics of Care and Reimagining the Law-
yer/Client Relationship, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 383 (1996).
192. Id. at 386.
193. Ellmann, supra note 186, at 2665; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What's Gender Got
to do with It?: The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of Care, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 265 (1996). I have purposely stayed away from the discussion of gender is-
sues in this piece though certainly the differences are worth exploring, as others have
done.
194. Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Transformation of Lawyering: A Response to
Naomi Cahn, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (1992).
195. Ellmann, supra note 186, at 2667.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Zwier & Hamric, supra note 191, at 384.
199. Shalleck, supra note 194, at 1078.
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conduct in mediation. And in fact, the ethic of care has been rec-
ognized as a moral foundation of mediation.2 ° °
Demonstrating an ethic of care consists of integrating care con-
siderations and empathy into one's work. Commentators agree
this could have a variety of impacts on the lawyer-client relation-
ship, ranging from more client autonomy 201 to more attorney con-
trol.2 °2 An ethic of care also is viewed as encompassing a "Golden
Rule" of communication.20 3 More specifically, this ethic places em-
phasis on listening with a goal of understanding the other's
thoughts, feelings, and desires.20 4 This, too, is an important ingre-
dient in the mediation process. Because part of the mediator's goal
is to assist the parties in their communication and understanding-
but not necessarily agreement-of the other's point of view, having
the attorney representatives come to the process with a mindset
open to the goal of understanding clearly would aid such
objectives.
Advocates of the care ethic urge movement away from self-inter-
est to "other interest," and an ongoing realization and acknowledg-
ment of "human interdependence. ' 20 5 This concern with self-
interest juxtaposed with "other interest" was expressed by another
commentator who noted that perhaps we have fallen short of the
genuine objectives of the mediation process if all we have is merely
enlightened self-interest.20 6 Even enlightened self-interest, in and
of itself, would be an advance in terms of conduct at mediation,
however. And although we might hope that one day lawyers and
clients alike would sincerely consider the interests of the other par-
ticipants at mediation, and the process be one based upon the in-
terdependence of people, we also must acknowledge that at this
point, many of the cases which are mediated are first in the adver-
sary system, inviting that mindset to the table. 7
200. Zwier & Hamric, supra note 191, at 389.
201. Menkel-Meadow, Symposium, Case Studies in Legal Ethics, Telling Stories in
School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
803 (2000).
202. Ellmann, supra note 186, at 1077.
203. Zwier and Hamric, supra note 191, at 403-404 (citing TOM RUSK, THE POWER
OF ETHICAL PERSUASION 7-8 (1993)).
204. Id. at 405.
205. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 193, at 279.
206. Symposium, supra note 108.
207. In part, Professor Robinson hopes to guard against those with the adversarial
mindset taking advantage of those who participate more cooperatively. See Robinson,
supra note 5.
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In the view of Professor Robert Baruch Bush, a new ethic for
those lawyers who represent parties in mediation would involve a
"different conception of human nature of who and what we are...
humans are not separate, unconnected, disconnected individuals,
but beings with intrinsic connections despite our separateness. 20 8
Professor Bush also has noted that Professor Len Riskin, in his
seminal article on Mediation and Lawyers, addressed the specific
question of mediation ethics for the lawyer during mediation.2 9
One theme that was discussed by Riskin was an ethic of caring and
connection, with an assertion that such an ethic is the foundation of
mediation, which explains why mediation really requires a different
philosophical map for lawyers.210
Although some are concerned that such a care or cooperative
ethic may put clients at risk, 2 1 an ethic of care does not mandate
that the lawyer care equally for everyone.212 It is plausible that a
lawyer, in the context of mediation, is able to care for his client,
and represent her interests, while simultaneously revealing care for
the other party, by demonstrating empathic listening and under-
standing. The skills involved in active listening are those that
mediators themselves utilize to uncover areas of mutual interest or
integrative potential. It is often because of this focus on interests
that a mutually agreeable resolution is achieved.213 Moreover,
when involved in conflict, often what individuals desire most is to
have someone listen to them. Although in many cases the media-
tor fulfills this role, it is even more effective if the other parties at
the table do so as well, especially those at the center of the
conflict.21 4
D. The Communication Standard
Commentators discussing the role of the lawyer representative in
mediation also have recommended an ethic of communication.215
This is distinct from the current requirements that lawyers commu-
208. Bush, supra note 206.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Robinson, supra note 5.
212. Ellmann, supra note 186, at 2701.
213. Note the difference between focus on interests and a mediation model that is
just about reaching a settlement number.
214. This need underlies the parties' desire for apologies, etc. Deborah L. Levi, The
Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1167-68 (1997).
215. E.g., Bush, supra note 206.
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nicate with clients about the matter they are handling.216 Rather,
this entails communication of a different sort. Such an ethic recog-
nizes that the basis for all human relationships is communication
itself.2 7 This ethic places importance upon determining ways to
"walk through the conflict process in a human and humane
way. '218 Such an ethic would require additional focus on teaching
and training in communication. 219 Ethical standards for represent-
atives in mediation also might embrace an empathy ethic, which
also may be considered part of the communication process.
E. The Standard of Altruism
There may be merit in also examining a separate ethic of altru-
ism.22° Putting empathy into action was one way in which altruism
was illustrated. 22' This is similar to the ethic of care, as one's focus
is on another. Application of the "Golden Rule" for lawyering
also emerges in the altruism concept as well. 222 Establishing a
golden rule for mediation is another proposal deserving of addi-
tional thought and consideration.
F. Additional Ethical Standards
Still, others might see a need to craft an ethic of cooperation or
collaboration. Although this may be considered as integral to
other ethical precepts such as good faith and care, as we initiate
discussions and proposals, it may be helpful to delineate additional
components in detail.
Likewise, an ethic of honesty or fairness might be imposed.
There is much concern, as discussed earlier, about the effect or ap-
plication of Rule 4.1 and its comments2 23 in the context of media-
tion.2 4 Although an honesty ethic could be part of good faith, and
216. See J. Nick Badgerow, The Lawyers Ethical Professional and Proper Duty to
Communicate with Clients, 7 KAN. J.L. PUB POL'Y 105 (1998) (focusing on the fiduci-
ary nature of the attorney-client relationship as well as the lawyer's rules of profes-
sional conduct).
217. Bush, supra note 206.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering? 8 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 385, 418 (1992) (emphasizing that lawyers should regard themselves as a
"helping profession," and work to build positive connections with people who come
into "legal contact" with one another).
221. Id. at 389-90.
222. Id. at 408.
223. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1999).
224. Alfini, supra note 106.
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likely is inherent in the care ethic, there may be good reason to
isolate this aspect of conduct, particularly in light of the often im-
plicit endorsement of deceit provided by Rule 4.1.225 In fashioning
an actual code of conduct, the foregoing are elements, or more ex-
plicit actions, which could be included in specific rule delineation
or as more broad generalizations, such as application of the Golden
Rule.
Others have recognized a need for an emotional range in law-
yers, noting that it is often absent.226 This element likely could be a
subpart of the ethic of care or of altruism. A distinct ethic of emo-
tional recognition, however, would place more emphasis on this
ability. The skill to recognize human emotions may be included in
a number of ethical considerations, but a distinct consideration
may be better.
Considerations of ethics in mediation also bring forth and em-
brace the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence.227 Therapeutic juris-
prudence ("TJ") is defined quite broadly as an approach to the law
and legal processes positing that the actions taken should be bene-
ficial or therapeutic for the individual, most often the client,
though some recognize that such a practice is also beneficial or
therapeutic for the lawyer as well.228 TJ takes as its particular fo-
cus the effect of law on the health of the individual. In other
words, anything that enhances psychological or physical well-being
would be considered to be within the realm and purview of TJ per-
spectives.229 Although the definitions of this approach are some-
what broad and difficult to explain more concretely, therapeutic
jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to lawyering that fo-
cuses on the achievement and maintenance of both the mental and
physical health of an individual. 30 Some recognize a resemblance
between TJ and ADR, in particular mediation.231 One of the foun-
dations of therapeutic jurisprudence is self-determination, that is,
225. E.g., Craver, supra note 105; Wetflauer, supra note 105.
226. E.g., Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1173, 1198-1200 (1999).
227. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 184, 184 (1997) (stating that "[t]herapeutic [j]urisprudence is the
study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent").
228. E.g., Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Juris-
prudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV.
15, 50-51 (1997).
229. Winick, supra note 227, at 192.
230. Id. at 186-87.
231. E.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Building a Pedagogy of Problem Solving:
Learning to Choose Among ADR Processes, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113 (2000).
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that an individual's own views should be honored. This perspective
certainly is analogous to the basics of mediation.
Finally, it also may be valuable to consider the use of new meta-
phors for the lawyer's work because they are powerful in framing
people's belief systems. 232 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow of-
fered a poignant example when she recommended reclassifying
lawyers' "war stories" as "peace stories. ' 233 It is this type of think-
ing and the behavior resulting from such thinking that will allow
the paradigm really to evolve.
By no means do I purport to have all the answers. In fact, as my
thinking progressed on this piece, additional questions kept emerg-
ing. Much more work remains to be done on these issues, but I
remain unequivocal that it must be done. Others have made spe-
cific recommendations for the role of the lawyer at mediation. My
concern, however, is that despite the excellent perspectives, in both
theory and in practice,234 lawyers will not be motivated to change
conduct unless and until mandated to do so.
Whether called an ethic of care and communication, one of good
faith, meaningful participation, or another similar term, a rule or
set of rules that recommend or require specific conduct conducive
to the mediation process must be enacted. For if mediation is to
survive as a formidable, unique process with the characteristics re-
maining that have made it a process resulting in party satisfaction,
then practices and procedures with regard to lawyers' conduct in
the mediation process must change, commencing with legal
education.
VI. CONCLUSION: ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS-
CALL TO ACTION
Assuming, arguendo, the enactment of very different standards
of conduct that demand very different skills, values, and attitudes
from the lawyer representative in mediation, additional questions
are posed. For example, can the same individual represent a client
in an adversary system and then transition or transform to serve as
a representative in a more cooperative problem solving system?
232. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By
221 (1980) ("The use of many metaphors that are inconsistent with one another seems
necessary for us if we are to comprehend the details of our daily existence.").
233. With apologies, I do not recall the time and place of the panel that we were
both on. But I do remember the comment.
234. Sternlight, supra note 5.
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235To place this query within the language used by others, can out-
standing wolves be effective sheep?
I suppose one simple answer is that it depends somewhat upon
the personality of each individual. One excellent analysis provides
words of caution in looking at attempts to change or modify the
conduct of lawyers. In a discussion of research, Professor Susan
Daicoff noted that individuals enter law school with specific traits,
and a psychological composite that is more disposed toward an ad-
versarial approach to dispute resolution.236 These include such
characteristics as competitiveness, insensitivity to emotional con-
cerns, and preference for viewing matters in a "rights" versus
"care" orientation.237 In fact, reports demonstrate that those who
are unable to resolve conflicts of personality and approach under
the adversary mindset drop out of law school.238 Expectedly, these
appear to be those individuals who are more collaborative and care
oriented.239 Daicoff also highlights the fact that the legal profes-
sion may not desire to change many of these traits, as they are nec-
essary for the practice of law2 40-implicitly within an adversary
system. Daicoff notes that there may be merit in requiring change,
but also warns to proceed with caution.24' She hints that there is
need for additional study and consideration.242 And although
changing behavior may be accomplished, changing basic character
traits is much more complex.2"3 Yet if we provide a greater variety
of roles for attorneys, perhaps there will evolve recognition that
those with different personalities may fit better within different
practices.
Although I certainly appreciate the concerns that Daicoff
presents, and recognize that the basic personality of individuals is
not something easily changed, I also urge that the influence upon
new lawyers of education and experience should not be underesti-
mated. Inherent characteristics may account for some of the ad-
versariness and competitiveness, 24  but it also must be
acknowledged that some of the antagonism and aggression utilized
235. Robinson, supra note 5, at 971.
236. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 581.
237. Id. at 579.
238. Id. at 580 n.243.
239. Id. at 585.
240. Id. at 548.
241. Id. at 593.
242. Id. at 595.
243. Id. at 589.
244. Id. at 585.
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in the adversary system is the product of learning and modeling.245
It seems as if, beginning in law school, lawyers are almost
"programmed" to approach each problem with a competitive and
adversarial state of mind. "6 Legal education works to magnify
those inherent tendencies toward competitiveness. 247
The adversary system of litigation is the primary frame of refer-
ence for lawyers, that with which they are most familiar, and that
which is frequently reinforced. As a predictable consequence, it
remains difficult, if not impossible, to convince them-sometimes
on the way to mediation-to view matters in a more cooperative
manner. In an excellent and entertaining discourse on the obsta-
cles to collaboration and mediation presented by the adversary
mindset, a8 David Hricik provides an informative look inside the
thinking and belief system of the trial lawyer. In utilizing a split
personality approach, Hricik's twin, Ernesto, had great difficulty
with some of the concepts urged at a symposium, such as duties of
good faith and disclosure of information at mediation.2 49 This was
not surprising because Ernesto had been a trial lawyer for some
time; Hricik concludes that Ernesto's voice echoes in the mind of
many trial lawyers.2  If that is true, then it will be with substantial
difficulty that transitions from competition to collaboration will be
made, particularly if made subsequent to experience in a law prac-
tice in which many adversary tendencies are reinforced.
In the view of some commentators, the mindset necessary for a
problem solving approach to dispute resolution is "fundamentally
incompatible with the mindset of effective trial advocates. 2 51 In
fact, the trial lawyer, as contrasted with the problem solver or dis-
pute resolver, has been analogized to that of the general and the
245. By "modeling," I refer to the phenomenon of learning by observation. In
many instances, novice lawyers attend depositions, hearings, settlement conferences,
and mediations with more experienced senior lawyers. Though direct teaching may
not occur, the neophyte who is eager to learn watches in detail the actions of her
superior and then when the opportunity is presented adopts those same behaviors and
attitudes-whether effective or not.
246. Daicoff, supra note 78, at 579.
247. Id. at 580.
248. David Hricik, Reflections of a Trial Lawyer on the Symposium: Dialogue with
the Devil in Me, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 745 (1997).
249. Id. at 747-52.
250. Id. at 756.
251. William F. Coyne, Using Settlement Counsel for Early Dispute Resolution,
NEGOT. J. Jan. 1999, at 11; see also James F. Henry, Some Reflections on ADR, 2000 J.
Disp. RESOL. 63, 65 (2000) ("The prospect of ADR entering the mainstream of con-
flict resolution is overwhelmingly related to the extent to which ADR becomes an
integral part of the practice and culture of the legal profession.").
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diplomat. 52 In other words, the contention is that the battle of
litigation must acknowledge a "cease-fire" if mediation is to be
productive, and a trial lawyer's temperament, more often than not,
is unable to stand down253-hence, the wisdom in the use of sepa-
rate and distinct "settlement counsel" for a mediation or problem
solving process.
Closely related to this idea of separate settlement counsel, is the
use of collaborative lawyering, which has as its foundation the crea-
tive, efficient, and workable resolution of a matter, usually before
litigation commences.254 Lawyers who are selected as "collabora-
tive counsel" or "settlement counsel" agree to foreswear litigation,
put away their swords, and instead work together to achieve a final,
mutually acceptable resolution.2 5 One inherent acknowledgement
made by proponents of collaborative lawyering is that litigation or
trial counsel who are known for "Rambo" or aggressive tactics are
not suitable for such a role.25 6 As the two systems-litigation and
collaboration-consist of quite different procedures and policies, a
distinct protocol was established for the collaborative lawyering
process 7.25  Essentially, the collaborative lawyering process2 58 con-
sists of a team approach to creative problem solving that encom-
passes elements such as open and honest communication,
cooperation, good faith, and willingness to listen. 9 This approach
seems strikingly familiar to the conduct urged in the mediation
process. One final important consideration is that if the matter is
not settled, then trial counsel will take over or go to arbitration or
mediation, and settlement counsel will no longer be involved due
252. Coyne, supra note 251.
253. Id.
254. Tom Arnold, Collaborative Dispute Resolution: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, in 16 AMERICAN L. INST. & A.B.A., COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, 379, 381
(2000). For more information on American L. Institute and ABA study materials and
programs, see http://www.ALI-ABA.org.
255. Id. at 382.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 382-385.
258. For additional review of the collaborative process, see Robert F. Cochran Jr.,
supra note 8; Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLIN. L.
REV. 427 (2000); Penelope Eileen Bryan, 'Collaborative Divorce" Meaningful Reform
or Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1001 (1999); Pauline H. Tesler,
Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 967 (1999); Robert W. Rack Jr., Settle or Withdraw: Collaborative Lawyering Pro-
vides Incentive to Avoid Costly Litigation, DIsP. RESOL. MAO., Summer 1998, at 8.
259. Arnold, supra note 254 at 383, 385.
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to the confidential and perhaps critical information they may have
260gotten in the collaborative process.
From the perspective of some then, it appears that those en-
trenched in the adversary system are not candidates for representa-
tion of parties in mediation. However, we know that not all
combatants are unable to be peacemakers. And whether we adopt
a belief that adversariness is innate, acquired, or a combination
both, we also must acknowledge and accept the influence of educa-
tion and learning. As noted before, education is a key element in
moving from an adversarial paradigm to that of collaboration and
problem solving.26' Yet we have not been vigilant in this educa-
tional mission. Focus has been placed on training law students to
be mediators, but little attention been devoted to the changing role
of the lawyer representative in mediation. 62 Recent advances,
however, toward reconceptualizing the lawyer role as one of a
problem solver are one effort in that regard.263
And although changes in legal education continue, these efforts
still will not affect most students until and unless rules for lawyer-
ing also are modified. When law school graduates enter practice,
they look to guidelines or parameters within which to practice. As
illustrated earlier, perhaps the context of practice should determine
exactly what those rules should be. New rules will necessitate new
learning, which, ideally, will assist individuals in a shift to under-
standing at a higher cognitive level and integration of that learning
into everyday practice.
Ethics rules have been, and continue to be, generated on a na-
tional basis by the ABA, and then made available to the states for
enactment. Adoption of a practice orientation to ethics, as urged
in this piece, dictates different methods for the enactment process.
Lawyers who represent clients in mediation do so in many jurisdic-
tions, thus the basis of enactment is also an important considera-
tion, whether on a national scale or something more global, such as
an international policy. These developments, no doubt, will be
considered as matters of multi-jurisdictional law practice and are
subjects for additional research, discussion, and debate.
260. Id. at 381.
261. Kovach, supra note 147, at 619.
262. However, one law school, Hamline University School of Law, in addition to a
traditional mediation clinic, does provide a representation in mediation clinic. For
more information on this program, see Dispute Resolution Institute, http://www.ham-
line.edu/law/adr.
263. See generally Symposium, Creative Problem Solving Conference, 37 CAL. W. L.
REV. 1 (2000).
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I realize that this essay raised more questions than it answered;
that was essentially intentional. I do not purport to have the solu-
tions to many of the issues presented, but I do feel that it is neces-
sary to initiate a dialogue. If lawyers are to have or assume any
role in representing clients in the mediation process, then we, as
legal educators, must, along with the bar, assume the responsibility
to assure that they do so competently-without the zeal and con-
tentiousness of the adversary system. Lawyers must navigate with
a different philosophical road map, must adopt different perspec-
tives, behaviors, and skills for a different role. To accomplish this
task, new behaviors and performances must be required and de-
manded of lawyers. This can be done only with adequate educa-








I have been teaching both alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") and professional responsibility for a long time, and I will
devote the majority of this essay to reporting on some of the enor-
mous changes and developments in this field. However, I will be-
gin with a mea culpa at a higher level of ethical consciousness than
the rules that govern us, or are about to govern us, typically use. I
have spent the last five years of my life writing ethical rules for
ADR, and I am worried about the future of this field. There are
many changes occurring in ADR, and I now fear that, because of
all the activity, we are about to encounter the possibility of "con-
flicts of laws" with respect to ethics in the practice of alternative
dispute resolution. If we do not already, we soon will have many
different rule systems governing our practice, some of which ex-
plicitly conflict with each other and others of which are implicitly
or indirectly in conflict.
This field, which I prefer to call "appropriate" dispute resolu-
tion,1 was intended to be flexible, make the world a better place,
and encourage different models of problem solving-not only ad-
versarial ones, but conciliatory ones. Yet appropriate dispute res-
olution is now becoming as complex, law-laden, and law-ridden as
the traditional practice of law.
From the outset, I have been a strong proponent of the need for
rules, regulations, and best practices standards because I care that
ADR is practiced "appropriately." We now call it "appropriate
dispute resolution," rather than "alternative dispute resolution,"
precisely to signal that different processes may be appropriate for
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Visiting Professor,
Harvard Law School; Chair, Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Reso-
lution-Georgetown University Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in
ADR. Thanks to Meredith Weinberg for her research assistance. This essay is based
on transcribed remarks delivered at the Association of American Law Schools' An-
nual Meeting, Joint Session of the Sections on Professional Responsibility and Alter-
native Dispute Resolution.
1. See Albie M. Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the Old-Fash-
ioned Way-We Earn It!, 4 NEG. J. 55, 62 (1988) (introducing the phrase "appropriate
dispute resolution").
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different kinds of disputes or in different types of settings. By us-
ing that label, we also acknowledge that we must make choices
about how to conduct different processes appropriately. We are
looking for the most appropriate way to try to resolve disputes,
plan transactions, solve international crises, and deal with commu-
nity and individual human problems. Therefore, ADR really is in-
tended to encompass more than just alternatives to a litigation
system.
This broadening of ADR presents the most troubling of the is-
sues in the development of the field in ethics, which is one of juris-
diction. Who has, or ought to have, ethical control over the
practice of this multi-disciplinary field, that draws from the teach-
ings and standards of many different professional and non-profes-
sional structures and ideologies? There, too, mea culpa. I have
been published widely as someone who is concerned about the un-
authorized practice of law.2 I do believe that some forms of evalu-
ative mediation and, these days, hybrid forms of arbitration, multi-
party dispute resolution, consensus building-many of the new
practices-ultimately prompt third-party neutrals to opine on the
law, suggest legal conclusions, or advise people in ways that, al-
though they do not create a technical lawyer-client relationship, do
implicate the giving of legal advice and may cause some people to
rely inappropriately on the statements of third-party neutrals.
Thus, I am concerned about liability issues and whether some dis-
pute resolution practitioners' activities constitute the unauthorized
practice of law.3 I will not focus on that issue in this essay, other
than to recognize it as one of the issues posed by the question of
determining who ought to regulate this multi-disciplinary practice.
Moreover, for those lawyers who want to encourage non-lawyers
2. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation The Practice of Law?, ALTERNA-
TIVES, May 1996, at 57. Whenever I make arguments about the unauthorized practice
of law, I think of my good friend, co-mediator, and co-trainer, Howard Gadlin, who is
a psychologist by training. E.g., THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION INFORMATION SOURCE,
THE GUIDE TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS (contain-
ing Dr. Gadlin's biographical information), http://crinfo.org/documents/h-bio/Gad-
lin_H.htm. When I complain about non-lawyers opining on the law, Dr. Gadlin
suggests that perhaps lawyers should be charged with the unauthorized practice of
psychology, since they attempt to facilitate parties' communication with little or no
training and, often, little or no skill. For an effort to provide some communication
skills generically, see DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO
DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST (1999).
3. E.g., OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SEC'Y, SUPREME COURT OF VA., GUIDE-
LINES ON MEDIATION AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW (1999) [hereinaf-
ter VIRGINIA GUIDELINES], http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/upl/preface.html.
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to contribute their additional learning and teaching, how should we
combine these multiple disciplines? 4
Turning to the major ethical concerns in the practice of ADR, we
may simplify the discussion a bit by considering what I call the
"Four Cs of Ethics and ADR." The first "C," which is largely ab-
sent from the rules, is the issue of counseling about ADR. Every
lawyer ought to have an ethical obligation to counsel clients about
the multiple ways of resolving problems and planning transactions.
A few states have included this obligation in precatory language,5
although very few have done so in required language.6 I think that
this ethical obligation should be mandatory, and I have suggested
this in my idealized Ten Commandments of Appropriate Dispute
Resolution.7
The second "C" of ethics and ADR is confidentiality. Although
our current ethics rules do not address confidentiality in detail,8
there is much regulation of confidentiality issues at the state level,9
and there soon will be regulation at the federal level, as well.10 In-
deed, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed a federal agency to
coordinate federal ADR,11 and the Code of Federal Regulations
and Federal Register soon will contain proposed regulations for
confidentiality in federal ADR.1 a These new regulations raise a
4. Several organizations have attempted to draft ethical rules to transcend disci-
plinary boundaries. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994), http://www.adr.org/ruIes/ethics/standard.html.
5. See Marshall J. Breger, Should An Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of
ADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2000).
6. Id. at 462 app.I.
7. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 167-68 (1999).
8. The current version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct does not treat
any of the substantial ethical issues with respect to lawyers serving as third-party neu-
trals. The traditional protection of confidentiality of lawyers and clients, Rule 1.6,
applies only to those in the privity of lawyer-client relationships. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1999). T'pically, parties and third-party neutrals are not in
this lawyer-client relationship. Rule 2.2, which attempts to deal with the lawyer serv-
ing as "intermediary" between two clients, simply assumes that the clients have no
confidentiality as between them if they are both using the same attorney. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (1999).
9. See e.g., NANCY ROGERS & CRAIG McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, PRACTICE
AND POLICY (2d ed. 1994).
10. Notice, Confidentiality in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs,
65 Fed. Reg. 83,085 (Dec. 29, 2000).
11. FED. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE REA-
SONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION ACT OF 1996 (2000), http://www.financenet.gov/financenet/fed/
iadrwg/confid.pdf.
12. Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. at 83,085.
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whole host of issues for those of us who are interested in the law of
privilege, evidence, and the Freedom of Information Act. At both
the federal and state levels, the ethical issues about confidentiality
in ADR conflict with "sunshine laws" and other open government
policies,' 3 and demonstrate the competing values that inform
ADR. Again, the question remains: Who should resolve those
issues?
The debate over Rule 4.214 presents another interesting issue
with relevance to whether state ethics rules govern federal lawyers
and law enforcement officials. If the federal government has a reg-
ulatory scheme for confidentiality or other issues, what do state
ethics rules, state evidence rules, or state mediation privileges have
to do with ADR practice at the federal judicial or regulatory level?
These conflicts of laws/conflicts of rules issues are quite complex.
The Honorable Wayne Brazil, a former law professor and current
magistrate judge who developed one of the most advanced ADR
programs in the federal courts, is a notable founder in our field
who has had to deal with these issues. 15 In a recent case, Judge
Brazil addressed some of these questions about which level of reg-
ulation governs confidentiality of mediation in the federal courts.' 6
This leads me into the third "C," conflicts of interest, as well as
into conflicts of rules and laws. We have multiple levels of regula-
tion in ethics and ADR for conflicts of interest for third-party neu-
trals, lawyers who participate as party representatives and
advocates, and former, present, and potentially future parties and
clients in ADR proceedings.
There are substantive laws, ethics rules, and court rules about
ADR and conflicts of interests at both the federal and state level.
13. See Charles Pou Jr., Ghandi Meets Elliot Ness: 5th Circuit Ruling Raises Con-
cerns About Confidentiality in Federal Agency ADR, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter
1998, at 9 (discussing the balance between openness for oversight and confidentiality
for potentially volatile issues); Christopher Honeyman, Confidential, More or Less:
The Reality, and Importance, of Confidentiality is Often Oversold by Mediators and the
Profession, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1998, at 12 (arguing that claims of "confiden-
tiality" can be exaggerated unnecessarily).
14. Rule 4.2 provides that "a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another law-
yer in the matter," unless the lawyer is authorized by law or given consent by the
other lawyer. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999).
15. E.g., WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT
APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (1985);
WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1988).
16. Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting the
tension between federal court rules that mandate confidentiality and state law).
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At the state level, California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New York, and Texas have been most active in addressing potential
conflicts. 17 These particular states are notable because they have
regulated conflicts of interest and confidentiality in substantive
statutes providing for ADR or mediation in evidentiary rules,18 as
well as in procedural court rules. 9 So there are both substantive
regulations, procedural rules, and court rules that exist at multiple
jurisdictional levels. Determining whether an arbitrator or media-
tor has a prohibited conflict of interest (involving a former, pre-
sent, or potential future client) may require consultation with a
wide variety of rule systems, including formal law and the many
rules created by private associations of mediators and arbitrators.2"
Because I have written elsewhere about the complexity of con-
flicts of interest issues in ADR,2' I will mention just some of the
key controversies. The major issue, both at the policy and rule
levels, is the extent to which the same individual should be allowed
to perform multiple roles as mediator and as advocate, at different
times and in different cases, in order to encourage the expanded
use of ADR. There is also a question of whether mediators, concil-
iators, arbitrators, and other dispute resolvers should be allowed to
practice in law firms with others who perform the more conven-
tional advocate's role, sometimes for the same or adverse parties.
Under our current ethics rules for lawyers,22 this situation is very
problematic. Should a mediator preside over a matter in which
that mediator, or his or her partner, may later represent one of
those parties in either a related, substantially related, or unrelated
matter? Should there be a time frame limiting that representation,
17. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 9, at app.A (summarizing provisions of state
confidentiality statutes).
18. E.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 2025 (West 2000); see also ROGERS & McEWEN,
supra note 9, at app.A (detailing the evidentiary issues that arise in mediations in
areas such as discovery, evidence, public access, non-parties, and protective orders).
19. E.g., ADR L.R. 2-5(d) (N.D. Cal. 2000) (establishing procedure for determin-
ing conflicts of interest in ADR context).
20. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASs'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COM-
MERCIAL DISPUTES (1977), http://www.adr.org/roster/arbitrators/code.html.
21. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S.
TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, New Issues, No Answers];
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631 (1997).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1999) (describing prohibitions and
exceptions for conflicts of interest in representation); id. R. 1.12 (explaining rules of
representation for former judges and arbitrators).
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or should it be allowed to occur with client or party consent, or not
at all?
If you have not been following the debate, this is where I some-
times fear I have wasted the last five years of my life arguing with
the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct (the "Commission" or "Ethics 2000 Com-
mission").2 3 In my view, many ethicists, professional responsibility
scholars, rule drafters, and practicing lawyers still do not get it-
that is, they do not understand what ADR is all about. They do
not recognize how the conceptions, purposes, and information
flows of ADR practice differ from those of more conventional le-
gal practice. At the same time, there is a risk that conventional
advocates will use ADR to "game" the system, leaking information
and manipulating the processes in ways that do need to be
regulated.
The current report of the Ethics 2000 Commission, which will be
presented to the ABA House of Delegates, has at least three
ADR-related provisions. First, the new Preamble to the Rules rec-
ognizes that lawyers may serve as third-party neutrals and may ex-
ercise peacemaking, as well as advocacy, functions.24 This is a
useful, if mostly symbolic, step forward.
Second, the newly proposed Rule 2.4 formally recognizes the
role of the third-party neutral within the context of services per-
formed by lawyers.2 1 The Rule only states that third-party neutrals
may be used, and that lawyers behaving as third-party neutrals
should describe their function and explain that they are not repre-
sentatives of the parties. The Rule suggests that lawyers serving as
third-party neutrals should advise unrepresented parties to consult
with lawyers if they either want legal advice or wish to understand
the details and complexities of ADR processes. There were addi-
tional proposals about what might have been included in the rule,
such as whether mediators and other third-party neutrals could
23. The Ethics 2000 Commission has completed its report of proposed changes to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which will go to the ABA House of Dele-
gates this summer. ABA ETHICs 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT, FINAL RULES PART Two (Nov. 2000), http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/e2k-finalrules2.html (providing the proposed rule changes and full Commission
report).
24. Id., Preamble [3].
25. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, PROPOSED RULE 2.4 (Nov. 2000), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
rule24.html.
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give legal information or advice,26 as well as whether mediators
could serve as scriveners for agreements, drafting mediated agree-
ments for the parties without running afoul of conflicts of interests
or other rules.27 Nevertheless, in the interest of simplicity, these
suggestions were not incorporated into the final proposed rules.
The third issue treated by the proposed new rules is a departure
from current standards or silences on the issue of conflicts of inter-
est. The newly proposed Rule 1.12 treats mediators as arbitrators
and judges have been treated by the rules in the past. The rule
permits screening, which allows an attorney who serves as a media-
tor in a law firm to be screened so that his or her partners may
subsequently represent one of the parties in the mediator's matter
without obtaining client consent.28
I still think that the Commission does not understand some of
the subtleties and complicated issues involved in determining
whether matters are substantially related, unrelated, or even the
same for purposes of determining conflicts of interest. In a sense,
this new screening rule actually permits a troubling "gray area" in
which a conflict still may exist, such as when a screened mediator's
partner serves as an advocate in an adversarial proceeding after an
unsuccessful mediation in that same matter. The Commission sim-
ply chose to draw some bright-perhaps too bright-lines and
treat mediators and arbitrators in the same way, where perhaps
there are some real differences.
26. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators state that mediators never
should give legal advice. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N ET AL., supra note 4, Rule VI,
cmt.4. The Virginia standards state that mediators can give legal information, but not
legal advice. VIRGINIA GUIDELINES, supra note 3. The distinction between these two
has always eluded me, see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, New Issues, No Answers, supra note
21, at 454.
27. The Judicial Council of Virginia has adopted ethical standards stating that,
although mediators are not prohibited from drafting agreements between parties,
they are obligated to encourage review by independent counsel prior to either party
signing the agreement. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VA., STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS (Oct. 2000), http://
www.courts.state.va.us/soe/soe.htm.
28. ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, PROPOSED RULE 1.12 (Nov. 2000), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
rule112.html. The proposed rule contains some ambiguity. It is "clear" ethical practice
that mediators almost never serve as advocates in an actual, or substantially related,
case that they have mediated. Current ethical disputes are about cases involving the
same clients or parties in slightly or very different matters. From these principles, it
would seem that a mediator's partners also should not be allowed to serve as repre-
sentatives in the same or a substantially similar matter (in other words, the old impu-
tation rule should apply here), but this result is not clear from the current version of
the rule.
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The rule also singles out "partisan arbitrators" as being similar to
advocates, even though partisan arbitrators are an entirely separate
group currently receiving a great deal of practitioner, if not schol-
arly, attention. Ethically, is the partisan arbitrator to be "just an-
other lawyer" on the case, subject to the ethics rules for advocates,
or is the partisan arbitrator to be more neutral?2 9
I want to explain why this screening rule is so significant. I per-
sonally did a 180-degree turn on this issue. As a strict ethicist and
someone who deplored conflicts of interest in conventional adver-
sary practice, I began my work in this field thinking that screens for
mediators and arbitrators should not be permitted. I have since
changed my mind completely, for policy reasons. Specifically, that
policy should encourage both traditional adversary practice and the
fourth "C," conciliation, within a single law firm.
The practice of law will be better informed if people are permit-
ted to be mediators, arbitrators, and advocates within the same
practice units, which in turn will provide greater information re-
sources for clients and lawyers. My utopian hope is that the culture
of law practice might change if third-party neutrals, conciliators,
and advocates inhabit the same offices. Thus, I have spent a fair
amount of the last few years trying to get the screen provision put
in place.
I am concerned that there still are complicated issues not cov-
ered by the current draft of the rule. As an illustration, a few
months ago I was training some extremely sophisticated intellec-
tual property lawyers in mediation, and I talked to them about
these ethics issues. Professional responsibility teachers will be
shocked to learn that when I described the proposed screen of the
new Rule 1.12 as a positive phenomenon, these practicing intellec-
tual property lawyers, who serve as both advocates and mediators,
understood this new rule as prohibiting them from engaging in
their current multiple kinds of practice, where they previously had
not been cognizant of the potential conflicts of interests issues. In
other words, they had not even conceptualized the possibility that
when a lawyer serves as a mediator in one matter, his or her part-
ner cannot represent one of the parties in that mediation in a re-
lated, or even an unrelated, litigation matter.
29. See Lawrence J. Fox, The Last Thing Dispute Resolution Needs is Two Sets of
Lawyers for Each Party, in CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTO THE 21ST
CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND ADR 47, 47-
48 (2001).
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It was quite clear to me that these senior distinguished intellec-
tual property lawyers, who were members of the pre-Watergate
generation that had not taken professional responsibility courses,
did not even recognize a conflicts of interest issue when they were
in the midst of one. It was surprising, given all the bar associations'
continuing legal education requirements, how little these lawyers
knew about conflicts of interest. Most of these quite prominent
lawyers have been mediating and representing parties without us-
ing screens and thinking the entire time that this was perfectly per-
missible. When I said, "The good news is that now you are going
to be able to perform both of these roles, provided you screen in
appropriate cases," they looked at me in horror, realizing that they
would now need to engage in all the complexities involved in
screening, such as the segregation of files and fees and the prohibi-
tion on discussions with firm partners on screened matters.
I offer that example to demonstrate: (a) the lack of knowledge
that still exists about our very basic rules of conflict of interest, and
(b) the significant effort that will be required to apply the complex
conflict of interest rules and screening to the ADR environment.
Finally, I will review a number of other very interesting develop-
ments in the regulation of ethical issues in ADR. For the last five
years, I have had the honor to chair the Commission on Ethics and
Standards of Practice in ADR ("CPR-Georgetown Commis-
sion"), 30 which develops some best practices in the field. This is
where my heart really is, in trying to make the field responsible for
acting appropriately and with good practices, while acknowledging
that, perhaps, we are still too new and young to fully regulate what
ought to happen. At the same time, we have been concerned with
the quality of the field, and, in particular, with the role of lawyers
who practice ADR in its myriad forms.
The CPR-Georgetown Commission has published two different
documents,31 which I think are quite useful for teaching profes-
30. The Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution-Georgetown
University Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in ADR [hereinafter
CPR-Georgetown Commission] is co-sponsored by the Center for Public Resources
in New York and Georgetown University and funded by the William and Flora Hew-
lett Foundation.
31. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, PROPOSED MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS
THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL (1999) [hereinafter CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, PROPOSED
MODEL RULE], http://www.cpradr.org; CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, DRAFT PRINCI-
PLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (2000) [hereinafter CPR-GEORGETOWN
COMM'N, DRAFT PRINCIPLES], http://www.cpradr.org.
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sional responsibility to students and training practicing mediators,
arbitrators, and other third-party neutrals.
The first document, which has been out for about a year and a
half, discusses our proposed ethics rules for lawyers who act as
third-party neutrals. This document concludes that mediators may
be lawyers and, therefore, they should be subject to all the ethics
rules governing lawyers who practice law or any other profession.32
In a sense, this proposed rule, though far-reaching and complex,
evades the question of what happens when mediators are not law-
yers. It fails to address the potential competition that we lawyer-
mediators may have with those who mediate from another disci-
pline, and who may not be subject to our conflict of interest rules,
fee rules, and other ethics rules.
The second document, Draft Principles for ADR Provider Orga-
nizations,33 is somewhat inspired by the wonderful work of legal
ethicist Ted Schneyer.34 This document is interesting because no
other body has attempted a similar project. Essentially, Draft Prin-
ciples for ADR Provider Organizations is an attempt to recognize
one of the major changes in the legal profession, that is, that since
organizations are providing legal services, there are situations in
which these organizations should be responsible, both in liability
and in ethics discipline, for the actions of their member service
providers. The document also specifies some best practices for or-
ganizations that hold themselves out as either providers of ADR
assistance, referrals, or direct services. These organizations would
include such entities as courts, which maintain rosters of mediators
and arbitrators; solo practitioners, like me, who hold themselves
out as mediators, arbitrators, and consensus builders; and other
third-party neutrals.
Draft Principles for ADR Provider Organizations has not been
adopted by any regulatory entity, jurisdiction, state, or professional
association, and so has no force of law. However, it does try to
elucidate a series of best and responsible practices involving such
issues as a graduated scale of information to be provided to parties
in ADR.35 For example, if parties in the dispute have greater in-
volvement in choosing their provider of ADR services, because
32. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, PROPOSED MODEL RULE, supra note 31.
33. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, DRAFT PRINCIPLES, supra note 31.
34. E.g., Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the law firm's role in regulating ethical behavior of lawyers
and suggesting that discipline should be meted out at the firm level in appropriate
cases).
35. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N, DRAFT PRINCIPLES, supra note 31.
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they reviewed r6sum6s or interviewed candidates for mediators
and arbitrators, then the referral organization would have a con-
comitant lesser responsibility for the assigned ADR provider. If an
organization, like a court, assigns an ADR provider without party
choice or input, then that referral organization should assume
greater responsibility for ensuring competence, proper credentials,
and training, as well as for assuring that the assigned person pro-
vides ethically permissible services.
This is fairly controversial material. For example, those who
work in the dispute resolution field know the American Arbitra-
tion Association often handles complaints about conflicts of inter-
est, including the circumstances under which an arbitrator should
reveal financial interest, past cases, or other conflicts that may af-
fect the arbitrator's ability to remain neutral. An organization re-
ferring providers of dispute resolution services has an uncertain
responsibility in assigning a third-party neutral to a case, as this
activity is currently unregulated. However, several organizations
that maintain panels and lists of mediators, arbitrators, and other
third-party neutrals have promulgated their own internal ethical
regulations, though they vary widely.36
Draft Principles for ADR Provider Organizations also is con-
cerned about quality control, particularly in information and com-
petence. When an organization suggests an ADR process or
recommends a particular provider, it has an obligation, in the CPR-
Georgetown Commission's view, to provide a lot of information
about what it all means-both information about the process itself,
the choice of neutral, and the type and quality of the neutral.
I would say, in a sense, there is a fifth "C" in the Ethics of ADR,
and that is choice. One of the values underlying Draft Principles
for ADR Provider Organizations recognizes the fact that parties
increasingly have less choice about whether to go to ADR and
which provider to use. Therefore, the entity recommending
ADR-or, to use another "C," coercing it, such as in the
mandatory referrals of some courts-should have some responsi-
bility for assuring the competence and integrity of the process.
The CPR-Georgetown Commission's Draft Principles for ADR
Provider Organizations might be a useful document to teach and
study. In particular, it might be interesting for professional respon-
sibility students to take a look at the larger question of entity or
organizational ethical responsibilities at the more general level and
36. E.g., JAMS-ENDISPUTE, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR ARBITRATORS, http://
www.jamsadr.com/ethics forarbs.asp; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N ET AL., supra note 4.
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then to examine the specifics to see whether they would make dif-
ferent choices in these areas than the CPR-Georgetown Commis-
sion has made.
Draft Principles for ADR Provider Organizations also contains a
very interesting taxonomy of all the different forms of ADR and all
the different kinds of provider organizations, including courts, pub-
lic entities, administrative agencies, private individuals, lawyers,
and non-lawyers. It is a very nice way to educate people who do
not know much about the field.
For people who are primarily professional responsibility teach-
ers, rather than ADR teachers, scholars, or practitioners, if you do
not learn this material, you are doing so at your own peril. This is
one of the many ways in which the legal profession and legal prac-
tice is changing dramatically. Virtually every state and federal
court requires some form of ADR at least to be considered by the
lawyers in a litigation matter,37 and, increasingly, transactions and
contracts contain ADR clauses. So if you teach professional re-
sponsibility, I urge you to get up to speed on the content of
ADR-its aspirations, visions, and hopes-and also to realize that
if you are looking for some interesting, complex, and new issues to
teach your students, you will not find a more fertile field for both
your mind and heart than that of thinking about the possible tech-
nical violations in ethics and what constitutes good practice in
ADR.
37. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, STATE STATUTES, http://www.adr.org (provid-
ing ADR statutes in all fifty states and the District of Columbia); 28 U.S.C. § 651(b)
(2000) (requiring all district courts to devise and implement ADR programs).
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